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I. INTRODUCTION
We ask a lot of our jurors. The financial and emotional bur-
dens of jury duty can be significant even in mundane cases. Deciding
another's fate is often a trying ordeal, aggravated by unintelligible
instructions, hostile attorneys or court personnel, miserable working
conditions, and interminable delays.1 The voir dire process may re-
quire jurors to reveal intimate, embarrassing, or damning information
about themselves and their families that they would not voluntarily
choose to reveal. 2 Confronted with allegations of violence, injury, or
abuse, some jurors become traumatized or ill.3 On top of all of this,
1. In the small proportion of cases in which jurors must endure sequestration, jury serv-
ice is even more arduous. See, for example, Beth Holland, Gotti Jurors' Tour of Duty a Stress
Test; Counseling Recommended, Newsday 6 (Jan. 27, 1992).
2. See, for example, Kirk Loggins, Claypole Jury Pressed on Alcohol Issues, Tennessean
B1 (July 12, 1995) (reporting that a juror began crying after revealing during voir dire that her
mother was an alcoholic and her maternal grandfather died from alcoholism); Brandborg v.
Lucas, 891 F. Supp. 352 (E.D. Tex. 1995) (considering the appeal of a veniremember who was
held in contempt and sentenced to three days in jail for refusing to answer questions about his
political affiliation, religious preference, viewing and reading habits, medical history, and other
personal issues).
3. Daniel W. Shuman, et al., The Health Effects of Jury Service, 18 Law & Pysch. Rev.
267, 268-72 (1994) (surveying relevant research and stating that recent studies and anecdotal
reports suggest that 'Jurors may experience stress from being removed from their families and
jobs, from being shown especially graphic evidence, or from the trial process itself'); James E.
Kelley, Addressing Juror Stress: A Trial Judge's Perspective, 43 Drake L. Rev. 97 (1994)
(reporting an Iowa study of over 500 jurors that demonstrated "severe stress symptoms" from
jury service, collecting sources documenting juror stress, and noting that some jurors exhibit
posttraumatic stress disorder long after trials); Thomas L. Hafemeister, Legal Report: Juror
Stress, 8 Violence & Victims 177, 178-80 (1993); Graciela Sevilla and Dan Beyers, For Jurors,
Grisly Trials Can Take Toll, Wash. Post C1 (Aug. 20, 1993); Stanley M. Kaplan and Carolyn
Winget, The Occupational Hazards of Jury Duty, 20 Bull. Am. Acad. Psych. & L. 325 (1992)
(detailing the physical and psychological effects of juror stress); Daniel Coleman, For Many
Jurors, Trial Begins After the Verdict, N.Y. Times C1 (May 14, 1991). Shuman, et al., surveyed
hundreds of former jurors from traumatic and non-traumatic criminal trials and found that
even in trials of non-violent crimes (such as credit card fraud) 47% of the former jurors reported
experiencing symptoms of depression and other'stress disorders during the trial, 45% during
deliberations, and 37% after the trial. The effect on jurors in traumatic cases involving violence
was much higher; for instance over 12% of these jurors met the minimum screening criteria for
depression compared to the base rate of 4-5% of the general population. Shuman, et al., 18 Law
& Psych. Rev. at 292-98.
One researcher of jury stress warns, however, that its frequency may be overstated, noting
that it is more probable that a juror would fall asleep than become traumatized by jury duty.
Letter from Thomas L. Hafemeister, Senior Research Associate, National Center for State
Courts, to Author (March 21, 1995) (on file with the Author). He notes elsewhere that "virtually
no work has been done to determine systematically whether the incidence or severity of juror
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jury service exposes jurors, their families, and their friends to exploi-
tation by the press and to retaliatory threats and unwanted attention
from defendants, victims, and sympathizers.
There are judges and legislators in this country who believe
that risking humiliation and fear need not be part of the job descrip-
tion for jurors, and they have taken unprecedented steps to prove it.
They have promised anonymity to jurors in all criminal cases, except
in limited circumstances. 4 In this Essay I examine these innovative
efforts and encourage other judges and legislators5 to consider the
routine use of anonymous juries in criminal casess at least in urban
areas where anonymity is feasible.7  By alleviating juror fear, ano-
nymity can enhance the participation of citizens in jury service, the
reliability of the voir dire process, the quality of jury deliberations,
and the fairness of criminal verdicts.
stress is increasing or to identify particular sources of it." Thomas L. Hafemeister and W. Larry
Ventis, Juror Stress-Sources and Implications, Trial 68, 71 (Oct. 1994).
4. See Part III.
5. In many jurisdictions, juror anonymity would require legislative adjustments.
Presently, statutes or rules in some states mandate the release of juror information. See, for
example, Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch.277, § 66 (West, 1994) ("A prisoner indicted for a crime
punishable with death or imprisonment for life, upon demand by him or his counsel upon the
clerk, shall have a list of the jurors who have been returned"); Commonwealth v. Angiulo, 415
Mass. 502, 615 N.E.2d 155 (1993) (finding that a state law barred a judge's effort to empanel an
anonymous jury in the trial of a notorious mobster); In re Globe Newspaper Co., 920 F.2d 88, 93
(1st Cir. 1990) (finding that a local district court rule barred sealing juror identities, absent
"specific and convincing reasons" why, in the particular case, jurors' names must be withheld);
Juror Privacy 4-6 (unpublished manuscript prepared for the National Center for State Courts
collecting state statutes and rules requiring disclosure of juror names) (on file with the Author).
6. My discussion is limited to the protection of the identities of jurors in criminal cases,
primarily because I have found little evidence that juror anxiety about harassment and
retribution is common in civil cases. The type of cases a jury hears undoubtedly has something
to do with whether jurors fear harassment by parties, their supporters, or the press. Those
criminal cases that reach a jury in the U.S. involve a disproportionate number of all violent
crimes prosecuted, while civil juries hear mostly automobile collision cases. Compare United
States Department of Justice, Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics-1993 522-23 (1994),
with George L. Priest, Justifying the Civil Jury, in Robert E. Litan, ed., Verdict: Assessing the
Civil Jury System (Brookings Institute, 1993).
7. See In re Baltimore Sun Co., 841 F.2d 74, 75 (4th Cir. 1988) (attributing the inability
of the press to identify venirepersons in the case before it to "the anonymity of life in the cities"
that "changed the complexion of this country"). Anonymous juries may be impractical in small
communities where a glimpse of a face or a few tidbits of employment information or life history
would allow community members to zero in on a name.
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II. JUROR FEARS
Juror apprehension about safety and privacy may be at an all-
time high. Rudolph A. Diaz, chairman of the Municipal Court
Presiding Judges Association in Los Angeles and President of the
California Judges Association, has reported that many people are
reluctant to serve as jurors even in misdemeanor cases and have told
him that they fear being approached at home after their assigned case
has ended. 8 Fellow Judge Philip K. Mautino, Presiding Judge of Los
Cerritos Municipal Court in Bellflower, California, says his wife was
frightened by her jury service, and that other jurors have told him
that they or their fellow jurors feared retribution if they convicted the
defendant.9
Jurors elsewhere are expressing similar concerns. 10 During
jury selection in Minneapolis for the trial of an alleged gang member
charged with the murder of a police officer, jurors expressed fear of
the defendant," of his sympathizers who had already staged
demonstrations, and of his fellow gang members who were suspected
of executing a man believed to have spoken with police about the
case.' 2  A researcher who recently debriefed jurors in Illinois in a
carjacking case noted that some jurors feared that the defendants or
defendants' family members might harm them in retaliation for their
verdict. 3 In Detroit, a postverdict survey revealed that seven of
8. Catherine Gewertz, Courthouse Makes Blanket Use of Juror Anonymity, L.A. Times
Al (July 25, 1994).
9. Kit R. Roane, We, The Jury, Who Are Anonymous, N.Y. Times A20 (Aug. 12, 1994).
10. See Kelley, 43 Drake L. Rev. at 102-03 (cited in note 3) (quoting a judge who related
juror nightmares about attacks on their families and friends); United States v. Scarfo, 850 F.2d
1015, 1023 (3d Cir. 1988) ("Jurors' fears of retaliation from criminal defendants are not hypo-
thetical.... As judges, we are aware that even in routine criminal cases, [jurors] are often
uncomfortable with disclosure of their names and addresses to a defendant").
The judge in the Branch Davidian case in Texas noted that the jurors were vulnerable to
members of the public who have "expressed highly emotional reactions to this case, and have
expressed an interest in affecting its outcome." See Janet Elliott, In San Antonio Federal
Courts, A Double Dose of Jury Secrecy, Tex. Lawyer I (Jan. 10, 1994). And in San Bernadino, a
judge reported, "Clearly there is a sense that somehow if jurors] do their duty they are at risk."
Don Babwin, Before the Verdict, Fear Prowls the Jury Room, Press Enterprise B1 (Aug. 23,
1995).
11. One juror told the judge that "I don't want [the defendant] to know where I live."
David Peterson, Fear Leads Courts to Special Steps; Jurors' Identities Withheld Even From
Lawyers in Trial of Ford in Haaf Slaying, Minneapolis Star Trib. 1B (April 19, 1993); Margaret
Zack, Potential Juror in Ford Trial Says He's Afraid to Serve, Minneapolis Star Trib. 1A (April
13, 1993).
12. The judge noted that given the demonstrations, she could easily imagine "riots in front
of [jurors'] homes" if the jurors were not given anonymity. Peterson, Minneapolis Star Trib. at
1B (cited in note 11).
13. Connie Lauerman, Juries on Trial: Defendants Aren't the Only People on the Hot Seat
in the Courtroom, Chicago Trib. at Tempo 1 (July 14, 1994).
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twenty-six jurors in the 1993 joint murder trial of police officers
accused of killing African-American motorist Malice Green responded
that they had been concerned for their safety during trial, even
though their identities had been suppressed. 14
A 1995 survey of 1,059 readers of Glamour magazine, primar-
ily working women ages eighteen to fourty-four, was particularly
revealing.15 When asked, "Should jurors in criminal cases be allowed
to serve anonymously?" Eighty-four percent answered, 'Yes, in all
cases."16 Another eleven percent answered, 'Yes, but only in cases
involving gangs, cults, or possible social unrest.'' 7 Only five percent
said no.'8 Only one-fifth of those responding to the survey had served
on a criminal jury, but of these, less than one-third (thirty percent)
said that they were not afraid of retribution.19 We cannot know if
these surveys and anecdotal reports accurately reflect the prevalence
of juror fear in criminal cases. Absent contrary evidence, however,
they suggest that a significant number of jurors are afraid. 20
Fortunately, juror nightmares do not often come true. Like our
contemporary fear of crime, our fear of harassment as jurors may well
outstrip reality.21 Still, enough harassment by opponents of verdicts
takes place to keep many jurors worried. Jurors who acquitted the
14. Survey of jurors provided by G. Thomas Munsterman (on file with the Author)
(hereinafter "Green Survey").
15. Jurors Should Serve Anonymously in All Criminal Trials, Say 84% of Young Women
Surveyed, PR Newswire (Feb. 13, 1995) (reporting survey details).
16. Should We Protect the Identity of Jurors in Criminal Trials?, Glamour 159 (March
1995) (quoting one respondent) ("We can never predict how any person with a vested interest in
the outcome of a trial-be it the defendant, the victim or friends of either-will react to an
unfavorable verdict. The court system should take no chances with jurors' safety and should
offer anonymity in all trials").
17. Id. (quoting one respondent) ("Our criminal justice system is flooded with cases that
don't involve dangerous individuals. Anonymity should be the exception, not the rule').
18. Id. (quoting one respondent) ("If a jury is given the right to judge, then a defendant
has the right to know who it is who's judging him." Said another, "Jurors are citizens who are
sworn to seek truth and determine justice. Where is the honor in anonymity?").
19. Id. (45% of the respondents who have served as jurors in a criminal case said they
were very afraid of retribution, 25% said they were afraid but their fear was unrealistic, and
30% said they were not afraid).
20. Over 15% of over 500 jurors in New York City who responded to a 1972 survey about
their attitudes toward jury service volunteered comments that they "objected to being required
to parade their names and addresses during voir dire in open court and in the presence of the
defendant in criminal cases." Caroline K. Simon, The Juror in New York City: Attitudes and
Experiences, 61 A.B.A. J. 209, 210 (1975). This suggests that juror apprehension is not an
entirely new problem, at least in some jurisdictions.
21. See Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics at 154 (cited in note 6) (noting that the
percentage of respondents rating crime as the most important problem jumped from 5% in 1981
to 37% in 1994); United States Department of Justice, Sourcebook of Criminal Justice
Statistics-1994 305 (1995) (noting that the estimated number of offenses per 100,000
inhabitants dropped from 5,858 in 1981 to 5,483 in 1993).
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officers who beat Rodney King endured taunts, threats, and disturb-
ing telephone calls after their names were made public.22 Death
threats also haunted the jurors in the trial of Dan White, convicted of
murdering San Francisco Mayor George Moscone and Supervisor
Harvey Milk. Some of these jurors moved or changed jobs after their
trial. One slept with an axe; another bought a gun.23  A Houston
woman reportedly received threatening phone calls and letters from
the cellmate of the man whom she and her fellow jurors had con-
victed.2 4 In Fort Worth, a defendant reportedly telephoned a juror at
home and made threatening comments after his lawyer had given him
the juror's questionnaire. 25 Jurors in California have reported harass-
ing or threatening mail from prisoners they convicted.26 In Florida, a
kidnapping victim, outraged at the jury for acquitting his alleged
captor, obtained the names of the jurors through the state public
records law and sent them each a letter "saying that he hoped that
someone close to them died a 'horrible, lingering death' so they would
know how he felt. '27 Seven of fifteen Florida court clerks that
responded to an informal poll following the incident stated that they
knew of cases where jurors were frightened by a defendant or an
22. See Sally Ogle Davis, The Last Angry Woman: Why King Trial Juror Linda Miller No
Longer Believes in Truth, Justice and the American Way, Los Angeles Mag. 58, 58-64 (July 1992)
(reporting a letter by the trial judge responding to a jurors' letter demanding to know "why were
we thrown to the sharks? How do I protect my children?" in which the judge stated, "Obviously,
had I been able to anticipate the terrible events that occurred after the verdict, additional effort
would have been undertaken to protect the identity and security of the jurors'; id. at 64
(reporting bomb threats at a juror's workplace); Rogers Worthington, L.A. Beatings Test Concept
of Jury Anonymity, Chicago Trib. N1 (Feb. 15, 1993); Lou Gelfand, To Print--or Not to
Print-Names of Jury Members, Minneapolis Star Trib. 27A (May 10, 1992) (defending the
newspaper's decision to publish the names and "brief biographical sketches of jurors in the
Rodney King trial, plus their views on law enforcement," which after the release prompted "a
stream of protests" from readers who charged that the publication had endangered the former
jurors and was totally unnecessary); Carol Innerst, Naming Jurors Draws Criticism, Wash.
Times A6 (May 4, 1992) (collecting charges that publication of the names of jurors was
irresponsible).
23. Hafemeister, 8 Violence & Victims at 178 (cited in note 3). One of the jurors was
quoted as saying that the trial "was the worst thing that ever happened to me." Maura Dolan,
Why Jurors Err: They're Just Human, L.A. Times Al (Sept. 25, 1994).
24. See Elliott, Tex. Lawyer at 1 (cited in note 10).
25. Wendy Benjaminson, Shroud of Secrecy Increasingly Veils Trials in Texas, Houston
Chronicle Al (March 13, 1994); Walter Olson, Juries on Trial, Reason 56, 58 (Feb. 1995)
(stating that the defendant called the potential juror at her home, informed her that he was
"impressed with her," and made "threatening remarks").
26. Committee Analysis Statement on Cal. S.B. 508 (Sept. 1995) (stating that "this bill is
necessary because there have been incidents where a defendant has received information about
the jurors and has harassed or threatened them by mail from prison").
27. Bill Analysis & Economic Impact Statement on Fla. H.B. 109 at 5-6 (March 16, 1995)
(hereinafter 'Bill Analysis'). Following media reports of the threats, 94% of the 345
respondents answered "No" to a newspaper poll that asked the question, "Do you think home
addresses of jurors should be part of the public record?" Id.
128
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associate. Some of the clerks stated that they had been asked by
inmates to provide the names and addresses of jurors.28
Jurors are beginning to express their concerns about being
pursued by the media as well. Although jurors maintain, "[W]e have
the right to some privacy, 29 one wouldn't know it from following trial
coverage in recent years. Press reports of information divulged dur-
ing the selection process spare jurors no embarrassment. The public
learns which jurors have been victims of crime, which jurors own
expensive homes, and which jurors consider themselves religious.30
After the trial, the integrity of jurors is commonly attacked in the
press by those who cannot accept the verdict.1 In the Spring of 1995,
the Supreme Court of Minnesota took judicial notice that the media
and the public had "harassed" jurors who acquitted a defendant of the
sexual assault and murder of a child in 1993.32
Although some jurors may relish the limelight, most jurors do
not want their lives and those of their families to become headline
news, nor do they welcome hate mail or fan mail from "cranks and
friends. '2 3 After a recent serial rape trial in Michigan, eleven of the
sixteen jurors objected to the release of their identities to the press
and public, citing both privacy and safety concerns. None of the
jurors wanted to attend a news conference following the verdict.
Instead, the jury prepared a statement that read:
28. Id. See also Tracy A. Bateman, Threats of Violence Against Juror in Criminal Trial as
Ground for Mistrial or Dismissal of Juror, 3 A.L.R.5th 963 (1992). Reports of threats to judges
may also raise jurors' apprehensions. See Martha A. Bethel, Terror in Montana, N.Y. Times
A23 (July 20, 1995) (detailing death, kidnapping, and arson threats toward a municipal judge
who refused to dismiss traffic tickets against a "freeman" with ties to the Militia of Montana).
29. Roane, N.Y. Times at A20 (cited in note 9) (quoting a juror).
30. Gary Kane, Palm Beach Paper Identifies Jurors, Houston Chron. A4 (Dec. 9, 1991)
(reporting the names of sequestered jurors in the trial of William Kennedy Smith along with
details of their lives including their experiences as victims of crime, the names of members of
their families, their religious preferences, and the values of their homes).
31. For example, the jurors who considered the cases against the Menendez brothers were
accused in the media of being charmed and duped. John Hinkley's jurors, as well, were ma-
ligned for their decision. See Saul M. Kassin and Lawrence S. Wrightsman, The American Jury
on Trial: Psychological Perspectives 2 (Hemisphere, 1988) (noting that 75% percent of those
responding to one poll felt strongly that the verdict in the Hinkley case was unjust, and quoting
Lincoln Caplan, Annals of Law: The Insanity Defense, New Yorker 45, 69 (July 2, 1984), who
noted that 'Jurors might well have felt like Vietnam veterans returning to a country whose
distaste for the long war came out as contempt for the soldiers').
32. State v. Bowles, 530 N.W.2d 521, 531 n.15 (Minn. 1995).
33. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 353 (1966) (decrying the judge's failure to insulate
the jurors from reporters and photographers and noting that the coverage of the jurors,
including the publication of their addresses, "exposed them to expressions of opinion from both
cranks and friends). Over a third of.the jurors in the Malice Green trials felt uneasy about
posttrial contacts by the press. Green Survey (cited in note 14).
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We worked hard to reach this verdict. It was the right thing to do. It was hard
on everyone, including all of the families involved. We shed a lot of tears. All
of our lives have been disrupted and we have been separated from our families
for over two weeks. Please respect our privacy and do not attempt to contact
us. Thank you for your consideration.3
More and more prospective jurors appear to be arriving at the court-
house (if they come at all) dreading the prospect that personal and
family information, and even the statements that they make during
deliberations, could become the focus of public comment.
3 5
III. RECENT RESPONSES TO JUROR FEARS
Several judges and legislators have responded to jurors' fears
by protecting juror identities from the press, from parties, or from
both. It is no longer unusual for federal judges to empanel
anonymous juries to protect jurors whenever there is a credible threat
to juror safety.3 6 Judges have also withheld juror names where safety
is not an issue, but privacy is.37 In at least four recent cases in Texas,
34. , People v. Mitchell, Opinion and Order Regarding Media Requests for Publication of
Juror Names and Addresses 6 (Cir. Ct. Washtenaw County, Mich. July 10, 1995) (copy on file
with the Author).
35. As Professor Abraham S. Goldstein recently observed, "[plotential jurors are being
taught that their deliberations will not be secret at all .... They will be asked for their reasons
and those of their fellow jurors for convicting, acquitting, or being unable to agree. And when
they return an unpopular verdict, the postverdict 'inquisition' by the media can easily take on
the quality of attaint at common law, figuratively punishing jurors for doing their duty."
Abraham S. Goldstein, Jury Secrecy and the Media: The Problem of Postverdict Interviews,
1993 U. Ill. L. Rev. 295, 296-97 & n.6 (documenting incidents of press harassment of jurors).
Thus it is particularly unfair to characterize this concern of jurors as merely a preference to
avoid "unflattering descriptions." Marc 0. Litt, "Citizen-Soldiers" or Anonymous Justice:
Reconciling the Sixth Amendment Right of the Accused, the First Amendment Right of the Media
and the Privacy Right of Jurors, 25 Colum. J. L. & Soc. Probs. 371, 407, 418 (1992) (arguing that
"a juror's concern about being described as 'stern,' balding,' or 'serious,' " does not rise to a "level
of interest compelling enough" to justify closing proceedings, and stating that media coverage,
"while unflattering and perhaps of little journalistic value, does little damage to jurors' ability to
do their jobs as independent evaluators of fact").
36. See, for example, United States v. Ross, 33 F.3d 1507, 1519-22 (11th Cir. 1994)
(reviewing several cases and noting the increased use of anonymous juries in federal courts, but
noting that "we feel that courts should be highly circumspect in ordering the empanelment of
anonymous juries"); Eva M. Redriguez, When Jurors Dare Not Speak Their Name, Legal Times
1 (May 9, 1994) (reporting that without prompting from prosecutors or defense counsel, Judge
Charles Richey arranged for the anonymity of jurors in the federal trial of now-convicted cocaine
king Rayful Edmond III). At least one federal judge has employed an anonymous jury in a civil
case. United States v. Real Property Known as 77 E. 3rd St., 849 F. Supp. 876 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
37. See Rita Ciolli, Trend On to Keep Jury Data Secret, Newsday 32 (March 25, 1990)
(reporting that in a murder trial, the judge deleted the names from juror questionnaires before
releasing them to the press and refused to release juror lists after he concluded that there was a
risk of juror harassment due to the feuding between the families of the victim and the defendant
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judges denied reporters access to jury lists even after trials had
ended,8 relying on a 1993 statute that permits judges to seal this
information absent a showing of good cause by a party or a member of
the news media. The statute had been passed after reports of juror
harassment. 39 The trial judge presiding over a rape trial in Michigan
was moved by the emotional refusal of the jurors to talk to the press
and refused to release the jurors' names and addresses. Citing the
"reality of the rigors of jury service and the brutality of today's media
coverage," he wrote:
Have we not punished, humiliated and harassed them enough by the time they
have finished the duty we summoned them to perform?... The need for pri-
vacy after a verdict is real and it is at that point that the media's seemingly in-
satiable demand for unlimited intrusions into these citizens' lives must finally
give way.
4 0
The Supreme Court of California is presently reviewing the
decision of a trial judge who declined to reveal juror-identifying in-
formation to the attorney of a convicted defendant after concluding
that there was "no sufficient cause to invade the privacy rights of the
jury and the sanctity of the deliberation process."'41 Meanwhile, the
and their supporters); Gannett Co., Inc. v. State, 571 A.2d 735 (Del. 1989) (denying a qualified
first amendment right of access to a public announcement of jurors' names during a criminal
trial); Pamela A. MacLean, Judge Blocks Media Access to Jury After Trial, U.P.I. (Aug. 22,
1990) (noting that federal Judge Louis Bechtle sealed the list of the names and home towns of
jurors in the corruption trial of U.S. District Judge Robert Aguilar in order to prevent
questioning by reporters). See also Bowles, 530 N.W.2d at 531 & n.15 (upholding the use of
numbered jurors since the 'Jurors could have reasonably concluded that were they to acquit
Bowles, they or their families would be vulnerable to harassment from the public," and noting
that the jurors in an unrelated case had been harassed after their verdict of acquittal). But see
United States v. Millan-Colon, 834 F. Supp. 78, 83-86 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (rejecting the
government's request for an anonymous jury where there was no showing of risk to jury safety).
38. Benjaminson, Houston Chronicle at Al (cited in note 25) (noting that the names of
jurors were kept from the press in the ethics trial of Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison; the murder
trial of Leroy "Animal" DeGarmo, after the jurors themselves asked the judge to keep their
identities from the defendant; the murder trial of Kerry Cook, which was upheld on appeal; and
the assault trial of Lorenzo Colston).
39. See id.; Elliott, Texas Lawyer at 1 (cited in note 10); Tex. Crim. Pro. Code Ann. art.
35.29 (Vernon, 1989 & Supp. 1996) (providing that jurors' addresses and phone numbers are
confidential and may not be disclosed by the court or the lawyers except upon a showing of good
cause by a party or a member of the news media).
40. People v. Mitchell, Opinion and Order at 22 (cited in note 34).
41. People v. Scott, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d 557, 882 P.2d 248, 248 (1994) (reversing the trial
judge's refusal to order disclosure, finding that the statute requires disclosure upon a defense
request). One member of the Court of Appeals panel, a trial judge sitting under assignment,
disagreed with the majority's conclusion that the statute in question required disclosure upon
request:
Most jurors are greatly concerned about their privacy. We must anticipate that the
public will soon learn that a defendant is entitled to the names, addresses, and tele-
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California legislature has enacted a statute designed to protect juror
identity more effectively than the state's former law. The new statute
seals all records of juror-identifying information at the conclusion of
all criminal jury proceedings, prohibiting disclosure to anyone,
including the defendant, absent a showing of good cause, as well as
prior notice to each affected juror.42
More legislation is on its way. A bill that would provide more
complete juror anonymity throughout the trial has been introduced in
California for the next legislative session.43 Similar legislation is
pending in at least two other states.44
phone numbers of the jurors if they vote to convict him. (The public is likely to overlook
the subtle consolation that this information is given only to his lawyer.) This knowledge
will impair both the willingness of citizens to serve on juries and the impartiality of
those who do serve. A mandatory-disclosure rule gives a new, personally threatening
meaning to the standard instruction requiring jurors to reach a just verdict "regardless
of the consequences."
People v. Scott, 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d 483, 35 Cal. App. 4th 1345, 1353-54 (1994) (Klein, J., concur-
ring), review granted, 882 P.2d at 248.
42. Act to Amend Sections 206 and 237 of the Code of Civil Proceudre, Cal. S.B. 508 (Oct.
16, 1995). Its first section reads:
The Legislature finds and declares that jurors who have served on a criminal case to its
conclusion have dutifully completed their civic duty. It is the intent of the Legislature in
enacting this act to balance the interests of providing access to records of juror identify-
ing information for a particular, identifiable purpose against the interest in protecting
the jurors' privacy, safety, and well-being, as well as the interest in maintaining public
confidence and willingness to participate in the jury system.
Id. The statute requires the sealing of all juror identifying information, but provides that the
court shall reveal the information if (1) a person seeking disclosure demonstrates good cause, (2)
the court finds there is no compelling interest against disclosure (a "compelling interest"
includes, but is not limited to, protection of jurors from physical harm), (3) notice is then
provided to each affected former juror, defense counsel, and the district attorney, (4) the court
holds a hearing, which may be closed, at which a juror may appear and protest the disclosure,
and (5) no jurors object or the objections are not "sustained" by the court. Id.
43. Act to Amend the Code of Civil Procedure, Cal. S.B. 1199 (introduced by Sen.
Mountjoy, Feb. 24, 1995, last amended Jan. 3, 1996). See also Stephanie Simon, Judges
Advocate Bill to Keep Juries Anonymous, L.A. Times B1 (Oct. 28, 1995) (reporting that
California's Judicial Council announced plans to study juror anonymity as part of its
comprehensive juror improvement project).
44. A bill in Florida would prevent the disclosure of identifying information about jurors
by the court or by attorneys and their agents, absent a showing of good cause. The bill reads:
The Legislature hereby finds and declares that the limited exemption from § 24(a), Art. I
of the State Constitution, the applicable public records law for judicial branch records
for identifying information regarding jurors empaneled in a criminal trial, is a public
necessity because:
(1) Explicit or implicit threats to jurors or their families or even a general fear of
retaliation could affect a jury's ability to render a fair and impartial verdict;
(2) A fair trial requires a jury that is fair and impartial, and jurors should not be
expected to take their chances on what might happen to them as the result of
carrying out their duties under the law; and
(3) The general and unrestricted release of identifying information on jurors in
criminal trials does not benefit the public, aid the public in monitoring the
effective and efficient operation of government in general, or contribute to the
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Another response to juror fear was tested by Judge Philip K.
Mautino and Judge John David Lord, Presiding Judges of the
Bellflower and Downey Municipal Courts in Los Angeles. Until
several months ago, jurors who had been summoned to their
courtrooms enjoyed anonymity upon request. Convinced that
protective measures were mandated in at least some cases, these
judges sought to remove the taint of prejudice associated with
selective anonymity 45 by offering anonymity in every case to any juror
who wanted it.46 As Judge Lord explained, "In those cases where
anonymity would not have been thought to be needed, it is still
provided so we won't have to bury some hapless juror with the
refrain---'Sorry, we had no idea anyone would react this way to your
efficacy of the courts in particular. The harm that might result from the
continued general and unrestricted release of this information outweighs any
public benefit that might result therefrom.
Safety and Privacy for Jurors Act of 1996 (draft sponsored by Rep. Greg Gay, not yet
introduced). In New York, lawmakers are considering legislation that would allow judges to
maintain the anonymity of prospective and selected jurors. Act to Amend the Criminal
Procedure Law, 1995 N.Y. A.B. 1760 (introduced Jan. 25, 1995) ("No prospective juror, whether
called to the panel term or not, and no member of the trial jury, may be asked to disclose his or
her name in open court, or in the defendant's presence"). Another bill pending in the same
committee in the New York Assembly would prohibit disclosure of juror names and addresses
upon a showing by the government that anonymity is necessary to prevent bribery, jury
tampering, or physical injury to, or harassment of the jurors. Act to Amend the Public
Authorities Law and the Executive Law, 1995 N.Y. A.B. 1279 (introduced Jan. 18, 1995).
Juror fears of retaliation expressed during jury selection for a police-killing case in
Minneapolis prompted one state legislator to introduce a measure that would allow a judge to
keep the names of prospective jurors secret if disclosure would 'Jeopardize the defendant's right
to a fair trial by impairing the ability to draw a qualified jury." See Donna Halvorsen, House
Bill Would Let Judges Keep Jurors' Names Secret, Minneapolis Star Trib. 1B (April 28, 1993). In
Massachusetts, a bill is pending that would allow anonymous juries if the trial judge concludes
that one is necessary. 1995 MA. S.B. 920 (introduced Feb. 21, 1995).
45. See text accompanying notes 92-96.
46. Don J. DeBenedictis, Anonymity Now Shields Jurors' Identities, 80 A.B.A. J. 16, 16
(Nov. 1994). Judge Mautino told reporters that during the year he conducted trials with name-
less panels, only six or seven of the 2,800 jurors called to serve in the Bellflower courthouse
chose to have their names made public when given the option of anonymity. Catherine
Gewertz, Judge Halts Blanket Use of Jury Anonymity in Bellflower, L.A. Times B3 (Jan. 10,
1995). See also Kitty Felde, California Judge Wants Jurors' Identities Kept Secret, on National
Public Radio, Morning Edition (Aug. 31, 1994). Judge Lord has never encountered a single juror
who preferred to make identifying information public.
The context and phrasing of any question to jurors about their preferences for anonymity
undoubtedly affects how jurors respond. Judge Lord informed me that he tried asking in
different ways, but eventually settled on informing the jurors as a large group that some courts
use a selection system in which jurors are referred to by number instead of by name, then asked
the jurors if anyone in the group would prefer to be referred to by number instead of by name.
"They'd all raise their hands," he said. 'Then I'd ask how many would prefer that I use the name
system, and no one would raise a hand." Telephone Conversation between Judge John David
Lord and the Author (May 2, 1995).
HeinOnline  -- 49 Vand. L. Rev.  133 1996
134 VANDERBILT LAWREVIEW [Vol. 49:123
verdict.' ' 47  The policy was enjoined after an alarmed public
defender's office entreated a higher court to "address the propriety of
anonymous juries before the practice becomes rampant and the
appellate courts are flooded with a deluge of postconviction appeals on
the subject. 418 A similar policy of automatic anonymity was reportedly
instituted in Riverside County, California, several months ago.
49
IV. THE ADVANTAGES OF JUROR ANONYMITY
These efforts to safeguard jurors' identities deserve serious
consideration. The presumptive or automatic anonymity proposed in
California 5 is especially promising. If a state legislature finds that
juror identities warrant protection in criminal cases,51 it should be
free to direct its courts to seal routinely, in every criminal case, the
names, telephone numbers, and home and work addresses of venire-
members and their immediate family members.52
47. See Judge John David Lord, Anonymous Juries (unpublished manuscript) (copy on file
with the Author).
48. See Petition for Writ of Mandate, Jansen v. Municipal Ct. of the Downey Judicial
District, M.C. No. 94M04945 (L.A. Cty. Sup. Ct. 1994) (copy on file with the Author); Order
Granting Petition for Writ of Mandate, Jansen v. Municipal Ct. of the Downey Judicial District,
M.C. No. 94M04945 (L.A. Cty. Sup. Ct. 1994) (copy on file with the Author). The California
Court of Appeals stayed the Superior Court's Order, but eventually let the injunction stand
without hearing arguments or reaching the merits, finding that the Municipal Courts did not
have standing to contest the order of the Superior Court. Court Rebuffs Judges' Bid to Use
Anonymous Juries, L.A. Times B2 (Dec. 3, 1994).
49. Babwin, Press Enterprise at B1 (cited in note 10).
50. See Cal. S.B. 1199 (cited in note 43). A slightly modified version of the anonymity-
upon-request practice of Judges Lord and Mautino holds promise as well. It too would require
courts to prevent the disclosure of juror identities to all persons, absent a special showing of
need. Individual veniremembers could be asked early in the selection process if they would
prefer to be identified by number during the court proceedings and in court records. (Peer
pressure would be reduced if the jurors could express their preference privately on a
questionnaire or individually.)
I prefer automatic anonymity over anonymity-upon-request because it is more effective in
eliminating suspicions that particular defendants are dangerous. Demanding that jurors choose
to be named or numbered raises the possibility that a particular venire or jury panel will con-
tain some jurors who are concerned about their anonymity and some who are not, creating
administrative complexity and perhaps even prompting jurors who were not initially fearful to
become fearful when they learn that others prefer anonymity. Also, anonymity-upon-request
still permits the inference that some defendants are more dangerous than others because it
allows for some juries to be anonymous and some not.
51. Juror fear may vary from locale to locale. Individual jurisdictions should attempt to
make independent findings on the need for anonymity, instead of generalizing from national
trends.
52. See, for exapnple, United States v. Ross, 33 F.3d 1507 (11th Cir. 1994) (protecting
information about a juror's spouse in addition to information about the juror himself).
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In practice, this approach would work as follows. Juror ques-
tionnaires, voir dire proceedings, and all other records and proceed-
ings accessible to the parties, counsel, or the public would contain
references to jurors by number rather than by name.53 At any time
during or after trial, the court could disclose a juror's name to parties
and counsel only upon a showing by either party that the juror's
identity is likely to lead to evidence sufficient to impeach the verdict
or sustain a challenge for cause, and that access to juror information
is needed to provide the court with adequate information to rule on a
motion for a new trial or a motion to excuse the juror. The standards
for identifying allegations sufficient to trigger disclosure could be
adopted from federal cases that require a preliminary showing of
juror misconduct as a condition of granting posttrial interviews or
hearings.54 The public, jury researchers, and the media would have
access to the identity of a juror only after trial. This access would be
dependent upon the juror herself revealing her identity, or upon the
permission of the court after prior notice to the juror.55 The judge
53. Detailed procedures for protecting juror anonymity are available from the National
Center for State Courts, the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York,
or from other courts that have successfully employed anonymous juries.
"The number of lists providing the cross-reference between the juror numbers and the
jurors' names and addresses should be kept to a minimum, and the location and persons having
access to these lists should be recorded by the trial judge. In fact, only the payroll clerk needs
this information. In the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, which
employed the first anonymous jury, not even the judge or other jurors knew a juror's name."
Timothy R. Murphy, Geneva Kay Loveland and G. Thomas Munsterman, A Manual for
Managing Notorious Cases 70 (Natl. Center for St. Cts., 1992) (footnote omitted). Another
procedure that some courts have used to safeguard juror identity is court-provided transporta-
tion of jurors to a meeting point away from the court. Id. at 72. "
54. See People v. Rhodes, 212 Cal. App. 3d 541, 552-54 (1989) (proposing standards for the
preliminary showing required for defense access to juror-identifying information, referencing
federal standards for posttrial interviews and hearings on jury misconduct).
55. The new California statute mandates similar procedures. See note 42. Of course, any
juror would be free to reveal his or her own identity at any time. The thornier issue is whether
the government can regulate one juror's freedom to disclose the name of another juror, a name
otherwise sealed, but which another juror came to know as a result of his service during the
trial. Prohibiting this type of juror speech implicates the first amendment rights of jurors, but
the Court appears open to limits on the freedom of governmental employees and participants in
the criminal process to reveal confidential information. For instance, Snepp v. United States,
444 U.S. 507 (1980) (approving an agreement by CIA employees not to disclose confidential
information without authorization), may support some sort of preclearance requirement before
jurors revealed this information. Justice Scalia has also made statements that support limits on
jurors' revealing the confidential identities of other jurors. See Butterworth v. Smith, 494 U.S.
624, 636-37 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring) (emphasis added):
I think there is considerable doubt whether a [grand jury] witness can be prohibited,
even while the grand jury is sitting, from making public what he knew before he entered
the grand-jury room. Quite a different question is presented, however, by a witness
disclosure of the grand jury proceedings, which is knowledge he acquires not "on his
own" but only by virtue of being made a witness.... There may be quite good reasons
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would retain the discretion to impose conditions upon access to jurors
and their identities. This approach would permit a party to pursue a
challenge or allow a researcher to question the juror, while
maximizing the protection for jurors.56
Before explaining the support for this proposal, a caveat is in
order. Many arguments for and against anonymous juries, including
those in this Essay, depend on predictions about how jurors behave
with and without anonymity. This country has probably seen more
anonymous juries in the last twenty years than in the past two centu-
ries. Still, most judges have never used one. With only a few excep-
tions, the judges who have empaneled anonymous juries have done so
rarely, usually in cases involving a high degree of notoriety.57 Given
such a limited set of cases, it is difficult to predict what effects ano-
nymity has on jurors and their verdicts, or whether the effects are
good or bad.58  Nevertheless, cases and commentary concerning
anonymous juries have tended to focus on the predicted harmful ef-
fects of anonymity; 9 few have explored its potential benefits, which
may prove significant. My aim is to present several hypotheses to
counter those advanced by the opponents of anonymity.
First, juror anonymity may significantly enhance the reliabil-
ity of the voir dire process. It is not uncommon for jurors to fail to
disclose sensitive information such as their past experience as a
why the State would want the latter information-which is in a way information of the
State's own creation-to remain confidential even after the term of the grand jury has
expired. It helps to assure, for one thing, that grand jurors will not be intimidated in the
execution of their duties by the fear of unjustified public criticism to which they cannot
respond. To allow them to respond, on the other hand.., would have its own adverse
effects, including the subjection of grand jurors to a degree of press attention and public
prominence that might in the long run deter citizens from fearless performance of their
grand-jury service.
But see Marcy Strauss, Juror Journalism, 12 Yale L. & Policy Rev. 389 (1994) (concluding that
without more evidence of ill effects, governmental regulation of 'Juror journalism" is an unwar-
ranted infringement of a jurors' first amendment freedom).
56. See text accompanying notes 107-09.
57. Anonymous juries have considered federal charges against the Branch Davidians, the
officers who assaulted Rodney King, Mafia boss John Gotti, and Oliver North. Anonymous
juries in state court have acquitted officer William Lozano of unjustifiably shooting an African-
American motorcyclist and convicted Paul Hill of murdering an abortion clinic doctor. Nameless
federal jurors also convicted Columbian hit man Munoz-Mosquera and gang leader Rayful
Edmond III. The jurors in both the O.J. Simpson and World Trade Center bombing cases were
anonymous.
58. See also Goldstein, 1993 U. Ill. L. Rev. at 313 (cited in note 35) (stating that
predictions about the positive effects of increased media exposure of jury deliberations are "the
grossest of speculations").
59. See, for example, Litt, 25 Colum. J. L. & Soc. Probs. at 371 (cited in note 35); Daniel P.
Lehner, Note, Anonymous Juries: Do the Benefits Warrant Jeopardizing the Right of the
Accused?, 11 Crim. Just. J. 187 (1988); Abraham Abramovsky, The Choices Surrounding the Use
of Anonymous Juries, N.Y. L. J. 3 (Sept. 30, 1993).
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victim of crime or the similar experiences of relatives. Researchers
who have documented this tendency have suggested that this may be
due to the embarrassing nature of this information. In one study,
investigators interviewed 190 former jurors in felony trials and found
that approximately one quarter of them had not revealed during voir
dire that they or members of their families had been victims of crime,
and that half of those who had failed to reveal this information had
been crime victims themselves. The researchers concluded that,
although it was likely that some of these jurors did not answer
correctly because they did not understand or have time to answer the
question, "other likely possibilities are that jurors seek to avoid
embarrassment."60 Other research suggests that jurors who are self-
conscious and anxious are more likely to give dishonest answers at
voir dire.61 Intuitive inferences like these have prompted judges to
order or uphold a variety of limitations designed to protect juror
information from public scrutiny during voir dire.62 Anonymity would
permit a juror to disclose information freely, knowing that, absent the
special showing outlined above, only a few authorized court employees
could trace whatever the juror reveals to herself or her family.
Because it can reduce jurors' fears of retaliation and exposure,
anonymity may also improve the deliberations of a jury. One jury
consultant has explained that "anxious jurors are less able to logically
follow an argument. Anxiety produces loose cannon jurors who could
be more influenced by their biases or courtroom drama than by the
evidence. '63 Other sources of juror apprehension are less subtle. The
60. Richard Seltzer, Mark A. Venuti and Grace M. Lopes, Juror Honesty During the Voir
Dire, 19 J. Crim. Just. 451, 460 (1991).
61. Linda L. Marshall and Althea Smith, The Effects of Demand Characteristics,
Evaluation Anxiety, and Expectancy on Juror Honesty During Voir Dire, 120 J. Psychology 205,
214 (1985).
62. For example, Justice. Harry A.- Blackmun has observed that "the defendant has an
interest in protecting juror privacy in order to encourage honest answers to the voir dire
questions." Press Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 464 U.S. 501, 513 (1984) (Blackmun,
J., concurring) (citation omitted). In one case, a panel of the California Court of Appeals upheld
the refusal of a trial judge to let a jury consultant examine juror questionnaires, concluding that
disclosure would adversely affect the willingness of prospective jurors to serve and vo lunteer
information. Pantos v. City and County of San Francisco, 198 Cal. Rptr. 489, 494 (Cal. App.
1984) ("[Disclosure would breach a juror's reasonable expectation of privacy and would
undercut efforts to encourage citizen participation in the justice system"). Other courts have
upheld in-camera proceedings for selecting jurors after finding that without such measures,
candor was impossible. See, for example, In re South Carolina Press Assn., 946 F.2d 1037 (4th
Cir. 1991) (allowing the voir dire of cases involving extortion charges against members of the
state legislature to be conducted in camera with the media excluded).
63. Gewertz, L.A. Times at Al (cited in note 8) (quoting jury consultant David Graeven).
A court made the point this way: "If the anonymous juror feels less 'pressure' as the result of
1996]
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specter of impending examination by, or exposure to, irate litigants
and a critical public may stifle jurors from speaking out during
deliberations or from taking unpopular or controversial positions.64
Juror anonymity also safeguards jurors from intimidation dur-
ing trials. Letters, phone calls, and other threats to jurors or their
families are not uncommon. 65 Not only do these contacts inevitably
make a juror's job more difficult, they carry other costs including
mistrials, juror replacements, and retrials.
anonymity, this is as it should be-a factor contributing to his impartiality." United States v.
Barnes, 604 F.2d 121, 141 (2d Cir. 1979) (emphasis added).
64. For instance, questioning the attorney representing the Boston Globe in its challenge
to a judge's decision to seal a jury list, then-Chief Judge Stephen G. Breyer reportedly asked if
jurors could be influenced by "what it would look like in the press." Elizabeth Neuffer,
Withholding Juror Lists is Violation, Lawyer Says, Boston Globe at Metro 36 (June 7, 1990).
Forty years earlier, Justice Felix Frankfurter voiced the same concern:
[W]e are living in a time when inroads have been made on the secrecy of the jury room
so that, upon failure to agree, jurors are subjected to harassment to disclose their posi-
tion in the jury room. Ought we to expose our administration of criminal justice to situ-
ations whereby federal employees must contemplate inquisitions into the manner in
which they discharged their juror's oath?
Dennis v. United States, 339 U.S. 162, 183 (1950). See generally Note, Public Disclosures of
Jury Deliberations, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 886 (1983) (arguing the case against the exposure of jury
deliberations). The effects of accountability on jury deliberations are more fully explored in Part
VA.
65. I make this claim based on the regularity with which discussions of judicial efforts to
respond to juror revelations of jury tampering appear in appellate reports. Jury tampering is at
least as old as the Republic. Property-holding qualifications for jurors were designed in part to
restrict jury service to those men least likely to be tempted by bribes. Jeffrey Abramson, We,
the Jury: The Jury System and the Ideal of Democracy 5, 29 & n.59 (Basis Books, 1994). For a
sampling of cases, see, for example, Weatherford v. State, 164 Ind. App. 340, 328 N.E.2d 756
(1975) (ordering a retrial after a call to a juror offering a bribe); State v. Coburn, 220 Kan. 743,
556 P.2d 376, 380 (1976) (upholding the denial of a motion for a mistrial after callers warned
two jurors to do "the right thing"); People v. Nickopoulos, 40 Mich. App. 146, 198 N.W.2d 691
(1972) (ordering a retrial after the trial judge had dismissed two of five jurors contacted by
phone because one of the two had been threatened and the other had been frightened by the
call); People v. Sher, 24 N.Y.2d 454, 248 N.E.2d 887 (1969) (upholding, four to three, the murder
conviction and death sentence of a defendant after the trial judge refused to grant a mistrial or
dismiss five jurors following their disclosure that they had received anonymous phone calls from
a woman telling them that the defendant was a vicious killer and urging them to disregard the
defendant's insanity defense and vote for the electric chair); Commonwealth v. Martin, 212 Pa.
Super. 224, 243 A.2d 456 (1968) (the sustaining a conviction for assault with intent to kill when
a juror reported to the judge after the trial that she had been threatened by an anonymous
caller during the trial); Tryon v. State, 567 P.2d 290 (Wyo. 1977) (involving a caller who told a
juror that the defendant had committed other similar acts); Pertgen v. State, 105 Nev. 282, 774
P.2d 429 (1989) (upholding a trial judge's refusal to grant a mistrial after three jurors reportedly
received calls offering them money if they would vote to acquit and threatening to kill them if
they voted to convict); Miller v. State, 741 S.W.2d 382 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) (involving a
situation where several jurors received calls threatening death to them or their families); State
v. Smith, 111 Utah Adv. Rep. 68, 776 P.2d 929, 931 (1989) (involving a caller's threat to a juror's
husband that if the defendant is convicted, 'Tm going to kill all the jurors'). Even civil jurors
are not immune. See Andrew Blum, Will Fish Sink Valdez Verdict?, Natl. L. J. A6 (July 3,
1995) (reporting an attempt to intimidate jurors by leaving dead fish on their lawns).
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Finally, juror anonymity promotes jury participation. In the
Superior Courts of Los Angeles County, where for a time anonymity
was routinely provided, jurors reported feeling "safer" and "relieved"
by their nameless status. "I kept thinking I was glad [the defendant
in a domestic assault case] didn't have a lot of information about me,"
said one.66 Ninety percent of those responding to one survey about
jury service said that they would be more willing to serve on a crimi-
nal trial if juror anonymity were guaranteed.67 Following reports of
threats to jurors by an angry victim in Florida, the rate of juror "no
shows" doubled.68 Judge Gregory Mize of the District of Columbia
Superior Court spoke for many judges when he warned that attention
to jurors may "make people more hesitant to serve because most of
our citizens... don't enjoy the spotlight."6 9
66. Another juror said she and other jurors felt nervous about stating their names in open
court. Gewertz, L.A. Times at Al (cited in note 8). Others have surmised that the guarantees of
anonymity in the second Rodney King trial, both during and after the trial, "may be the
reason[s] so many agreed to be prospective jurors." Worthington, Chicago Trib. at N4 (cited in
note 22). A potential juror in that case reportedly demanded of the judge, "You're not solemnly
swearing our questionnaires will be kept confidential. Why don't you take an oath?" The judge
replied, "Your anonymity, as far as the court is capable of doing, is insured." Rogers
Worthington, All 333 Prospective Jurors for L.A Beating Case Decline to Bow Out, Chicago Trib.
N5 (Feb. 4, 1993). Many judicial opinions as well have recognized the connection between
anonymity and a juror's willingness to serve. See, for example, People v. Rhodes, 212 Cal. App.
3d 541 (1989) (noting that the disclosure of juror names would chill participation).
Of course, a judge's promise of anonymity will not always be enough to calm some jurors'
concerns. It is conceivable that a situation may arise where nothing short of steps equivalent to
the government's witness protection program could completely protect jurors. For example,
enterprising media sleuths could uncover juror names, given enough incentive. See, for exam-
ple, Kane, Houston Chron. at A4 (cited in note 30) (pointing out that the identities of all six
William Kennedy Smith jurors and two alternates were discovered by the press); Bill Boyarsky,
Shielding Simpson Jury Selection in the Name of Efficiency, LA. Times B1, B5 (Sept. 18, 1994)
(noting that movie scenes of "hysterical reporters and TV crews chas[ing] people down corridors
and streets... are not an exaggeration," and predicting that "limiting reporters' access [to
jurors) will drive them to [new] heights of rudeness-and ingenuity"); Wade Lambert, More
Angry Men: Militias Are Joining Jury-Power Activists to Fight Government, Wall St. J. Al, A7
(May 25, 1995) (reporting that the Fully Informed Jury Association mailed each of the jurors
who were promised anonymity in the Branch Davidian case pamphlets reminding them that
they had the power to acquit against the law, after a supporter followed the jurors to a secret
parking lot and obtained their license-plate numbers).
67. Glamour at 151 (cited in note 16) (quoting one respondent) ("I would be happier
serving on a jury if the defendant did not have government-provided access to me or my
children'. Only 3% of the respondents stated that anonymity would not affect their willingness
to serve.
68. Several of the threatened jurors contacted the court clerk and said they would never
serve on a jury again. Bill Analysis at 5 (cited in note 27).
69. Garry Sturgess, Dire Days for Voir Dire-Too Many Trials, Too Few Willing Jurors
Place Great Strains on Justice System, Legal Times 1, 19 (Sept. 10, 1990).
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V. OBJECTIONS TO ANONYMITY
Balanced against these potential benefits of juror anonymity
are several predicted harms, many of which are based on equally
untested assumptions about juries or juror behavior.70
A. Anonymity and Jury Accountability
Let me start with what I call the accountability objection to
anonymity. "Accountability to the community is an important pres-
sure on [jurors] to do the right thing," said one professor.71 Editorials
have termed proposals for juror anonymity "noxious" and a return to
"star chambers.72 One judge's critique was just as blunt: "Next we'll
be putting all the judges under hoods."73 Underlying these remarks
are two assumptions: (1) individual jurors, like judges, should be ac-
countable to the public for what they do, and (2) if the public does not
know their names and addresses, jurors will act less responsibly7 4
Both assumptions are flawed.
Judges should be accountable to the community; so must legis-
lators, prosecutors, and all other elected or impeachable officials.
Jurors are different. Our jury system deliberately insulates the jury
from political and social pressures that may influence the actions of
prosecutors, the press, or politicians. We place our faith in the ability
70. See Worthington, Chicago Trib. at N1 (cited in note 22) (reporting that U.S. District
Judge Marvin Aspen has argued that no one has yet made a convincing case for how the quality
ofjustice is negatively affected by concealing jurors' names).
71. Gewertz, L.A. Times at Al (cited in note 8) (quoting Professor Paul Rothstein). Some
respondents to the magazine survey about jury anonymity said anonymity would eliminate
jurors' feelings of accountability. One stated, "If a juror is going to decide the fate of a human
being, she should be fully prepared to own up to that responsibility." Glamour at 159 (cited in
note 16).
72. Shrinking into Secrecy, St. Petersburg Times at Editorials 2D (April 2, 1995).
73. Roane, N.Y. Times at B8 (cited in note 9) (quoting Judge Dickran M. Tevrizian, a
federal judge in Los Angeles). For similar concerns, see Baltimore Sun, 841 F.2d at 74 ("[T~he
risk of loss of confidence of the public in the judicial process is too great to permit a criminal
defendant to be tried by a jury whose members may maintain anonymity').
74. Professor Marla Sandys suggested to me, for example, that like the subjects in studies
of the effects of "deindividuation" who exhibited more aggression when hooded and anonymous,
jurors' urges to punish may be less restrained when they cannot be identified by name. See
Philip G. Zimbardo, The Human Choice: Individuation, Reason, and Order versus
Deindividuation, Impulse, and Chaos, in Arnold and Levin, eds., Nebraska Symposium on
Motivation (1969) (arguing that anonymity in any area of a person's life increases the chances
that the person under a veil of anonymity will be more likely to engage in antisocial behavior).
Compare by analogy, McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission, 115 S. Ct. 1511, 1530-37 (1995)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing the Court's recognition of a "right-to-speak incognito" in
striking down Ohio's prohibition of anonymous election pamphlets, stating that anonymity
"facilitates wrong by eliminating accountability).
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of the jury selection system to produce a group of conscientious
community members who will do the right thing. Cut off from outside
information, jurors must consider the evidence and instructions in
each case using only the knowledge and experience they bring to the
jury box. Unlike the decisions of other public officials, jury verdicts
are not subject to voter review. Jury trials enlist the individual con-
sciences of jurors for one isolated task; we do not retain good jurors
and boot out the bad.7 5 Jury deliberations are shielded from scrutiny,
precisely to discourage partisan behavior.78 Professor Goldstein, who
has advocated even greater restrictions on postverdict contacts with
jurors, summed up the problem well: 'We do not give jurors the
robes, the tenure, the professional training, and the perquisites to
make it either fair or appropriate to ask them to play so public a
role."77 Promoting community control or influence over jurors would
be as foreign to our jury system as holding individual voters account-
able for their votes would be to our democracy7 8
75. Justice Stanley G. Feldman of the Arizona Supreme Court put it succinctly when he
stated that jurors "are accountable to no one but the law and their own consciences." KPNX
Broadcasting Co. v. Superior Court, 139 Ariz. 246, 678 P.2d 431, 443 (1984) (Feldman, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). Consider also the remarks of Judge Joseph F. Weis,
Jr. of the Third Circuit: "anonymity would seem entirely consistent with, rather than anathema
to, the jury concept." Scarfo, 850 F.2d at 1023. In addition, because jury service is not
voluntary, it would seem appropriate to offer jurors protection from community retribution that
we would not extend to judges, legislators, or even voters.
76. Professor Goldstein has collected rules and practices guarding jury secrecy and insu-
lating the jury from community pressures in his article advocating greater restrictions on
postverdict interviews of jurors about their deliberations. See Goldstein, 1993 U. Ill. L. Rev. at
297-99 (cited in note 35). See also Abramson, We, the Jury at 182-205 (cited in note 65)
(defending the requirement that jury verdicts be unanimous in order to preserve "the distinctive
genius of the jury system.., to emphasize deliberation more than voting and representation').
77. Goldstein, 1993 U. Ill. L. Rev. at 314 (cited in note 35). As the Chief Judge of the
Hennepin County bench explained, pillory of jurors by the press and public may lead to a
"situation where the jury is making the politically correct decision," a throwback to what he
describes as the racially driven verdicts in the South decades ago. Doug Grow, They Can Take
Away the Jurors' Names, But Not Their Fears, Minneapolis Star Trib. 3B (April 13, 1993).
Indeed, jurors who are perceived as susceptible to community influence are often maligned as
cowards by those who favored a different verdict. For example, after jurors acquitted Damian
Williams and Henry Watson of many of the offenses for which they were charged in connection
with the beating of truck driver Reginald Denny and other victims, the jurors were accused of
succumbing to threats of mob violence. Seth Mydans, Juror in Denny Case Recounts Stress and
an Obsession With Detail, N.Y. Times A18 (Oct. 27, 1993); Jim Newton, L.A. Trials Show 'Blind
Justice' is Hard to Achieve, L.A. Times Al (Oct. 24, 1993).
78. Compare by analogy, McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1517 (noting that this country's
"respected tradition of anonymity in the advocacy of political causes" is "perhaps best
exemplified by the secret ballot, the hard-won right to vote one's conscience without fear of
retaliation" (emphasis added)). In some jurisdictions, other rules appear to endorse individual
accountability for jurors, such as the prohibition in some states against anonymous jury polling.
See State v. Lewis, 18 Or. App. 206, 524 P.2d 1231, 1233 (1974) (ordering a retrial of the
defendant whose jury was allowed to respond by secret ballot to the court's poll about its verdict,
explaining that the "practice of anonymous jury polling, while permitting the court to ascertain
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In addition to my disagreement with those who assert that
juror accountability is the American way, I also object to the sugges-
tion that anonymous jurors will dispense verdicts that are, as a whole,
worse than verdicts of identified juries. It is true that, until a juror's
identity is disclosed, the only people who could demand that she
explain her vote are the other jurors and the juror's family and closest
friends. But jurors under these conditions may not necessarily
produce verdicts that are any less just or accurate than named jurors
who are under public scrutiny at all times. 79
Predictions that anonymous jurors will not take the time and
effort to "get it right" are premature and demeaning. Such warnings
hold no greater promise of accuracy, in my view, than the comment of
potential juror Betty Blakeley, age fifty-three, who asserted, "Jurors
take their job seriously whether you use their names or not."O More
importantly, even if anonymity does increase the risk that some
fraction of verdicts will be the result of cavalier decision making, ano-
nymity undoubtedly decreases much jury error by relieving juror
anxiety to some extent. If anonymity has any effect on verdicts at all,
it seems reasonable to suppose that it will increase, rather than de-
crease, the ability of a jury to arrive at a sensible decision.
Studies of the effects of accountability on decision making re-
veal that the benefits of juror naming may be overrated. Several re-
searchers have found that subjects who expect to be required to justify
their decisions are more likely than unaccountable subjects to pay
closer attention to detail and avoid jumping to conclusions,81 produc-
ing what one researcher termed "complex, and "self-critical" thought.82
that the requisite number of votes for conviction has been obtained, also permits each juror to
effectively avoid his individual responsibility to the defendant and the public," yet
acknowledging "the possibility that the jurors' desire for anonymity might have been fostered by
fear of reprisal").
79. Professor William Stuntz termed this constraint on juror action "internal
accountability" and also suggested that the presence of a large number of jurors, 12 in most
felonies, promotes careful decision making as well.
80. Roane, N.Y. Times at A20 (cited in note 9). See also Stephen Chapman, Mouthing Off;
Loose-Lipped Jurors Are a Danger to the Justice System, Chicago Trib. N27 (April 13, 1995)
(noting that the 'jury has built-in safeguards" to protect against the "abuse" that some predict
will result from juror secrecy: unanimity, a large number of jurors, and the power of judges to
overturn verdicts when jurors report misconduct).
81. See, for example, Richard M. Rozelle and James C. Baxter, Influence of Role Pressures
on the Perceiver: Judgments of Videotaped Interviews Varying Judge Accountability and
Responsibility, 66 J. App. Psych. 437 (1981).
82. For instance, in a study in which a researcher asked undergraduates to judge the guilt
of a hypothetical defendant after hearing competing evidence and arguments, subjects who
expected to justify their judgment of guilt or innocence were more likely to revise initial im-
pressions and recall more detail than either subjects who realized they were accountable only
after exposure to the evidence or subjects who were not asked to justify their decisions. Philip
[Vol. 49:123142
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This effect, however, is not uniform,8 3 nor has it been tested in a deliberative
context or shown to affect the verdicts of mock juries. Jurors
deliberate together, unlike the subjects in these studies. The process
of discussing and defending one's views to fellow jurors, as well as the
prospect of defending the verdict to one's closest personal relations,
may well generate the self-criticism that researchers suggest total
anonymity sometimes removes.8 4
Research also shows that public accountability may exacerbate
tendencies we do not want to encourage in jurors. Accountable
decision makers, it appears, are more likely than anonymous decision
makers to search for ways to pass off responsibility for the decision to
others (a special concern for juries deciding a death sentence),85 to
overvalue worst-case scenarios,86 and to refuse to make concessions.
Moreover, they are more likely than anonymous decision makers to
shift their decision toward the views they believe are held by their
E. Tetlock, Accountability and the Perseverance of First Impressions, 46 Soc. Psych. Q. 285, 286,
290-91 (1983).
83. Accountable and unaccountable subjects seemed to behave similarly in another study
that asked them to judge another person's motivations after the subjects learned of that
person's freedom to choose another course of action. Philip E. Tetlock, Accountability: A Social
Check on the Fundamental Attribution Error, 48 Soc. Psych. Q. 227 (1985). Another study found
that decision makers who were worried about fending off high-level critics were most likely to
escalate their commitment to their initial decision and were most inflexible in defending their
original positions. Frederick V. Fox and Barry M. Straw, The Trapped Administrator: Effects of
Job Insecurity and Policy Resistance upon Commitment to a Course of Action, 24 Admin. Sci. Q.
449 (1979). The safest conclusion seems to be that people have "dramatically different strategies
for coping with" the need to justify their judgments and decisions to others "depending on...
who is accountable to whom" and in what ways. Philip E. Tetlock, Accountability: The
Neglected Social Context of Judgment and Choice, 7 Research in Org. Beh. 297, 310 (1985).
84. See, for example, Marla Sandys and Ronald C. Dillehay, First-Ballot Votes,
Predeliberation Dispositions and Final Verdicts in Jury Trials, 19 Law & Hum. Beh. 175, 191
(1995) (discussing the significant effect of deliberation and other social influences in the jury
decision-making process).
Three other researchers into jury decision making, somewhat dismayed to find that individ-
ual mock jurors often settled on verdicts without considering alternatives, suspected that
deliberations mitigated this effect. Deanna Kuhn, Michael Weinstock and Robin Flaton, How
Well Do Jurors Reason? Competence Dimensions of Individual Variation in a Juror Reasoning
Task, 5 Psych. Sci. 289, 295 (1994) (stating that "social exchange with these other minds may
thus go a long way in providing the corrective to what we have found missing in the thinking of
individual jurors"). Professor Goldstein recently concluded that existing research does not
reveal any attempt to measure the effect on a group (assured of privacy while it performs the
group function) of an awareness that its activities will be disclosed afterwards, stating that
"systematic research has not been conducted to determine whether individuals and groups are
affected by knowledge that their behavior subsequently may be exposed." Goldstein, 1993 U. Ill.
L. Rev. at 313 & n.75 (cited in note 35).
85. Philip E. Tetlock, The Impact of Accountability on Judgment and Choice: Toward a
Social Contingency Model, 25 Advances in Exp. Soc. Psych. 331, 359 (1992) (terming this
reaction "buckpassing').
86. Id. at 349-50.
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prospective audience.8 7  If, indeed, public accountability encourages
jurors to act as political partisans seeking to placate whatever group
poses the greatest risk of retribution, rather than as individuals with
independent consciences, it is exactly what we don't need more of in
our jury system today. "Anonymity," as Justice Stevens recently
observed, "is a shield from the tyranny of the majority. ''88
Opponents of juror anonymity who view accountability as a
needed safeguard may also be concerned that anonymous jury trials
will appear unfair to observers, reducing public confidence in the
fairness of the jury system. Again, this concern is unwarranted.
Certainly we have more confidence in the fairness of jury proceedings
when we know enough about jurors to conclude that they will act
fairly and without undue bias against one party or the other.89 But
the name of a juror is itself empty of meaningful content, at least on
the question of how the juror might decide a case. Instead, the public
looks to other information-the juror's political views, occupation,
race, age, etc. This information is readily available from
questionnaires and voir dire proceedings, even when jurors are
anonymous. Does our ability to assess the fairness of a criminal jury
really depend upon knowing the name and address of Juror Number
92 when we can learn that Juror Number 92 is a white male, fifty-
eight years old, born, raised, and still living on the west side of
Detroit; that he has worked for the United States Postal Service for
the past thirty-five years primarily at a branch serving lower- and
middle-class customers; that he grew up as the youngest of six
87. Id. at 341. When decision makers believe that they will be accountable to constituents
monitoring their performance, they are more likely to engage in noncooperative behavior during
negotiation. When individuals feel accountable only to the person with whom they are negotiat-
ing, accountability increases cooperation during negotiation. See Roderick M. Kramer, Pamela
Pommerenke and Elizabeth Newton, The Social Context of Negotiation: Effects of Social
Identity and Interpersonal Accountability on Negotiator Decision Making, 37 J. Conflict Res.
633, 638-40 (1993) (concluding that accountability influences the goals that individuals adopt
during decision making and the rules that guide such behavior). See also Tetlock, 25 Advances
in Exp. Soc. Psych. at 361 (cited in note 85) ('When accountable subjects feel that their moral
mettle is being tested... they may be more motivated to hold others responsible and to reject
situational explanations or excuses").
88. McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1524 (explaining the Court's decision to strike down a state law
punishing anonymous election pamphleteering on first amendment grounds). See Abramson,
We, the Jury at 5 (cited in note 65) ('"To get the jury that resists the tyranny of the state, we
must risk our freedom on the jury that practices its own petty tyranny"). Abramson also traces
the disappearance of the jury's ability to decide questions of law to the fear that jurors would be
too influenced by popular will to uphold the equal protection of the law. Id. at 90.
89. See, for example, Nancy J. King, The Effects of Race-Conscious Jury Selection on
Public Confidence in the Fairness of Jury Proceedings: An Empirical Puzzle, 31 Am. Crim. L.
Rev. 1177, 1184-85 (1994) (collecting sources suggesting that jury composition and perceived
neutrality affect perceptions of fairness).
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siblings with a father who worked at an auto company glass plant;
that he believes a woman's place is at home raising children, and
considers himself an independent but generally votes Republican;
that he reads The Sporting News and the Detroit News, belongs to the
Lions and the AARP, watches the Capitol Gang every week on
television, enjoys fishing, and works out on a Nordic Track when he
can find the time (and so on)?90 When we can learn all of this about
every juror, what more do names and addresses add?
B. Defense Claims
Criminal defendants have argued that anonymous juries de-
prive them of two entitlements protected by the United States
Constitution: the presumption of innocence and a jury that is
"impartial." The Constitution, however, cannot be stretched to pro-
hibit the kind of state innovation that I advocate in this Essay.91
1. Routine Anonymity Does Not Suggest Guilt
Today, most federal and state courts grant juror anonymity, if
they allow it at all, only after a judge is convinced that the case poses
a particularly high risk of jury tampering or retaliation. 92 As long as
jurors believe that withholding their names is an extraordinary prac-
tice, anonymity will suggest to them that the judge considers the
defendant to be a particularly dangerous person who may retaliate if
90. See, for example, the coverage of the jurors in the federal civil rights trial of the white
officers who beat Rodney King or the coverage of the jurors in the trial of O.J. Simpson. We
know their ages and their occupations; we learn what they said during voir dire, their race,
ethnicity, and their hobbies. Norma Meyer, Their Job Done, the 'Unknown" Jurors are Free to
Fade Away, San Diego Union-Trib. A2 (April 17, 1993); Laura A. Galloway and Ann Griffith,
Questionnaires Reveal Attitudes of King Jury, L.A. Times B1 (March 15, 1992) (detailing juror
information given in the Rodney King trial).
91. I am not advocating that the Constitution compels juror anonymity, but merely that
the Constitution permits it. States are entitled to some leeway here.
92. See United States v. Krout, 66 F.3d 1420, 1427 (5th Cir. 1995) (emphasizing that the
decision to empanel an anonymous jury is "a drastic measure, which should be undertaken only
in limited and carefully delineated circumstances'; United States v. Ross, 33 F.3d 1507, 1519-20
(11th Cir. 1994) (holding that because "an anonymous jury raises the specter that the defendant
is a dangerous person from whom the jurors must be protected," courts should not use them
unless "there is a strong reason to believe the jury needs protection"); United States v. Paccione,
949 F.2d 1183, 1192 (2d Cir. 1991) (requiring a strong reason to believe the jury needs
protection), cert. denied 505 U.S. 1220 (1992); United States v. Crockett, 979 F.2d 1204, 1215
(7th Cir. 1992) (same), cert. denied 113 S. Ct. 1617, 123 L. Ed. 2d 176 (1993); United States v.
Thai, 29 F.3d 785 (2d Cir. 1994) (same), cert. denied 115 S. Ct. 456 (1994).
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convicted.93  The resulting apprehension cannot help but erode the
presumption of innocence. A prospective juror for the trial of a defen-
dant alleged to have participated in a gang execution of a police officer
made just this point when he admitted during jury selection that he
feared retaliation by the defendant's gang and that the court's secu-
rity precautions, including efforts to keep jurors' names secret, only
reinforced his fears.14
Yet this defendant's own lawyer, appealing the anonymity
order in the case after conviction, raised an argument that illustrates
why automatic or presumptive anonymity would escape this criticism.
He conceded that anonymity would not convey the same message to
jurors if jurors believed it was routine. To make his point, he likened
routine juror anonymity to the routine use of airport metal detectors.
Screening every flight generates less individual apprehension than
would be the case if detectors were used only to screen the most dan-
gerous flights.95 Granting juror anonymity routinely, rather than
upon proof of a real risk to juror safety, would remove the stigma of
guilt that selective anonymity carries.96
93. 60% of the 5% of survey respondents who rejected anonymity rejected it because it
may prejudice juries against defendants. Glamour at 159 (cited in note 16).
94. Zack, Minneapolis Star Trib. at 1A (cited in note 11). Paula DiPerna recounted her
discussion with a woman who was not selected to serve on the anonymous jury chosen for the
Brinks trial. The woman suggested that many jurors had been frightened by the anonymity and
had made up reasons to be excused. Paula DiPerna, Juries on Trial: Faces of American Justice
107 (Dembner, 1984).
95. See Mark Brunswick, High Court Takes Up Issue of Anonymity for Jurors,
Minneapolis Star Trib. 1B (Nov. 3, 1994). The Supreme Court of Minnesota found that the
selective use of anonymity did not violate the defendant's right to be presumed innocent. State
v. Bowles, 530 N.W.2d 521, 531 (Minn. 1995) (finding that the trial judge took adequate
precautionary measures to ensure that juror anonymity did not infringe on the defendant's
presumption of innocence and noting that he informed the veniremembers that they would
remain anonymous to shield them from media harassment).
96. The selective use of anonymous juries has also been criticized because it encourages a
judge to lie to the jury about the reason for their anonymity, telling them it is to protect them
from the press and not the defendant. See State v. Accetturo, 261 N.J. Super. 487, 619 A.2d 272,
273-74 (1992) (expressing skepticism about whether jurors would actually believe that media
coverage accounts for anonymity); Daniel P. Lehner, Note, Anonymous Juries: Do the Benefits
Warrant Jeopardizing the Rights of the Accused?, 11 Crim. Just. J. 187, 196-97 (1988). With
automatic anonymity, a judge could forthrightly explain that anonymity is a precautionary
measure to protect jurors from the public, the press, victims, witnesses, defendants, or whoever
might have an incentive to try to contact, harass, or influence jurors during or after the trial.
Judges instructing anonymous juries today already try to reduce the possible prejudicial impact
of their anonymous status by telling them that anonymity is a "common practice" and "is in no
way unusual." See Accetturo, 619 A.2d at 274 (quoting a typical instruction in federal court);
Kristan Metzler, Edmond Appeals Verdict; Jury Procedures Crux of Argument, Wash. Times C6
(Feb. 2, 1995) (reporting Court of Appeals Judge Laurence H. Silberman's statement that when
the judge told jurors that anonymous juries were not unusual, he "told them a little white lie");
Bowles, 530 N.W.2d at 528 (quoting the judge's instruction to the jury: 'The reason for that
anonymity is so that you will not be bothered by people from the media or anyone else during
146
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2. Routine Anonymity Does Not Impair the Selection of an Impartial
Jury
Another weak argument against routine anonymity is that it
prevents the disclosure of bias during voir dire and hampers litigants
from choosing an impartial jury. Defense attorneys have complained
that restricting access to jurors' names and addresses deprives them
of essential information they need to eliminate biased jurors97
Litigants do not need this information in order to select an
impartial jury. It is doubtful that a juror's name or address would
lead to a challenge for cause; this information is only helpful in devel-
oping hunches of dubious merit for exercising peremptory chal-
lenges.9 8 Even if the Sixth Amendment provided some sort of entitle-
ment to the informed use of peremptory challenges, access to juror
questionnaires and follow-up voir dire can provide more than enough
additional information to make up for the lack of names or ad-
dresses.99
the jury selection process, during the trial, or after the trial"); Nancy A. Novak, Note, Jury on
Trial: Juror's Constitutional Right to Privacy Falls Under Scrutiny of the Courts, 3 San Diego
Justice J. 215, 223 (1995) (providing an example of jury instructions that explain that
anonymous empaneling is to protect against media coverage).
97. For example, they have argued that simply learning what quadrant of a city a person
lives in is not enough, given the variety of neighborhoods within those areas. See Eva M.
Rodriguez, Anonymous Juries: More Common, Controversial, Legal Times 1 (May 9, 1994). See
also Cathy E. Bennett and Robert B. Hirschhorn, Bennett's Guide to Jury Selection and Trial
Dynamics in Civil and Criminal Litigation § 7.16 (West, 1993).
98. See Petition for Writ of Mandate, Jansen v. Municipal Court of Downey 9-10 (Cal. App.
1994) (copy on file with the Author); Jos6 Maldonado, Nameless and Fair, Newsday 56 (Aug. 20,
1993) ("At best, a name reveals ethnicity. This is hardly the kind of information one would
deem proper when selecting a juror). Still some lawyers consider ethnicity very important
information, and believe that they can judge ethnicity from a name. See Mark Brunswick, Ford
Trial Foreshadows Bowles: Issues of Race, Jury Privacy and Gang Politics Resurface,
Minneapolis Star Trib. 1B (June 10, 1993) (quoting a defense attorney who objected to
anonymity) (stating that "ethnic identity can tell you background, neighborhood; it's very
important').
99. See Rodriquez, Legal Times at 1 (cited in note 97) (noting how the judge in the Rodney
King civil rights trial had jurors fill out a more than 50-page questionnaire, in part to balance
the unavailability of names and addresses); Scarfo, 850 F.2d at 1022 (finding that a
questionnaire combined with individual voir dire by the judge and counsel allowed more
information than is available in most other trials, so that suppressing information about juror
identities did not deprive a litigant of information "reasonably necessary to the intelligent
exercise of his peremptory challenges"); Thai, 29 F.3d at 801 (finding that a 68-page
questionnaire made up for the lack of jurors' names and addresses). Those defendants wealthy
enough to afford in-depth personal investigations into each juror's life, such as the "drive by
checklist" recommended by jury expert Cathy Bennett, which includes descriptions of cars, toys,
and pets in the neighborhood, the juror's home, and bumper stickers on neighborhood cars,
would just have to get by with more detailed written questionnaires. See Bennett and
Hirschorn, Bennett's Guide to Jury Selection, App. Vol. at 509-512 (cited in note 97).
1996]
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Litigants are probably better off picking jurors without access
to their names and addresses anyway. It is more likely, given the
nature of the voir dire process, that anonymity would enhance, rather
than impair, truth-finding. In other words, forgoing information
about identity should yield information that is much more valuable to
defense attorneys. Judge Philip Mautino, one of the few judges who
has actually used anonymous juries consistently for any length of
time (admittedly a biased source), claims that prospective jurors who
are assured anonymity have been more forthcoming about their lives
in pretrial questioning than jurors who have no such assurances. 100
Without anonymity, jurors learn (sometimes through careful
warnings by the judge before voir dire) that whatever they say or
write may be publicized.101 Such reminders probably have the same
effect on jurors that Miranda warnings have on suspects: those
warned reveal less.102 A juror who is confident that she and her
family cannot be identified by anyone but a few specified court
employees may disclose information about herself that she might
otherwise conceal.103
100. See Catherine Gewertz, Challenge to Anonymity of Jurors Rejected, L.A. Times BI
(Sept. 1, 1994) (discussing Judge Mautino's anonymous jury policy and the legal challenges it
faced from the Los Angeles public defender's office).
101. Indeed this was exactly the result in California where one panel of the Court of
Appeals ordered that henceforth all juror questionnaires had to warn jurors that their answers
would not be confidential but open to inspection by the press. Copley Press v. Superior Court of
San Diego, 278 Cal. Rptr. 443, 452 (Cal. App. 1991). See also Robert Buckman, Press Right of
Access Outweighs Juror Privacy, Ed. & Pub. Mag. 18, 35 (Aug. 7, 1993) (noting that persuading
judges to warn jurors was one of the aims of a reporter who appealed a judge's effort to redact
the names from questionnaires in the trial of a man who shot a Japanese exchange student who
was looking for a Halloween party).
102. Compare Paul G. Cassell, All Benefits, No Costs: The Grand Illusion of Miranda's
Defenders, 90 Nw. U. L. Rev. (forthcoming 1996) (concluding that Miranda led to a 16% decline
in confession rates).
103. Consider, for example, the judge's decision to conceal the names of veniremembers
during jury selection in the trial of an art gallery for displaying allegedly obscene photographs
depicting males in sadomasochistic acts and others displaying children's genitals. Attorneys for
both sides reportedly "grilled" prospective jurors on their views about homosexuality, abortion,
AIDS, and their religious backgrounds. Jury Selection Includes Opinions About Homosexuals,
U.P.I. (Sept. 25, 1990).
Limiting media access to the responses of jurors to questionnaires and during voir dire also
encourages jurors to be candid about information that may lead a party to object to their
inclusion in the jury. In Colorado, for instance, juror questionnaires prominently display a
notice that the questionnaire is not a public record, and parties and their agents are not allowed
to reveal questionnaire contents. 1995 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-71-115. See also Gen. Stat. Conn.
§ 51-232(a)(3) (1995). But giving the media only names and nothing else undermines two
additional interests that I address later: the interest of the press in reporting trials and the
interest of promoting public confidence in the fairness of jury proceedings. See text
accompanying notes 123-26. This alternative also fails to mitigate juror fear of defendants,
victims, or the public. Compare by analogy Bowles, 530 N.W.2d at 532 (upholding the use of an
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3. Routine Anonymity Does Not Prevent the Discovery of Jury
Misconduct
Even assuming jurors are forthright during the selection proc-
ess, there is no guarantee that their behavior, or the conduct of those
who may influence them, will remain beyond reproach for the rest of
the trial. Sealing the names or addresses of jurors makes it more
difficult for convicted defendants and their attorneys to uncover juror
misconduct that could form the basis for a valid challenge to the
verdict. Deprived of the ability to mine jurors for evidence of
irregularity, defendants must rely on sources independent of the
jurors or hope that conscience-stricken or fame-hungry jurors will
divulge jury misdeeds themselves.104 Yet protecting the defendant's
right to a fair trial, free from improper influence, has never required
more than this. The interest of a criminal defendant in discovering
jury misconduct has traditionally been limited by the competing
interests advanced by protecting jurors from postverdict inquisition.
Convinced that posttrial interviews chill both candid deliberations
and jury participation itself, many jurisdictions have forbidden
defendants and their attorneys or investigators from contacting
former jurors after their verdict, absent a preliminary showing of
misconduct and leave of court. 10 5 The trend seems to be to tighten,
anonymous jury, stating that "withholding jurors' names from the media would not have
eliminated the risk of harassment or retaliation from" the defendant or his supporters).
104. For example, the California Attorneys for Criminal Justice ("CACJ") opposed Cal. S.B.
508 on this ground. Committee Analysis Statement at 9 (cited in note 26) (noting CACJ concern
that the bill would make it difficult or impossible to investigate juror misconduct on appeal).
105. See United States v. Radonjich, 1 F.3d 117, 120 (2d Cir. 1993) ("Limiting questioning
[of former jurors] to those jurors who come forward on their own is proper unless the district
court determines, in its discretion, that more inquiry is necessary"), cert. denied 114 S. Ct. 897
(1994); Globe Newspaper, 920 F.2d at 92 n.5 (listing federal court rules and state statutes
containing similar restrictions); Maldonado v. Missouri Pacific Railway Co., 798 F.2d 764, 769
(5th Cir. 1986) ("[The party seeking to question jurors postverdict must make a 'preliminary
showing of misconduct' "), cert. denied 480 U.S. 932 (1987); United States v. Badolato, 710 F.2d
1509, 1514-15 (11th Cir. 1983) (rejecting the defendant's motion to interview jurors for failure to
show evidence of outside influence during deliberations); U.S. S.D. Tex. Rule 12 (providing that
"except with leave of the Court, no attorney, party, nor agent of either of them may
communicate with a former juror to obtain evidence of misconduct in the jury's deliberations");
Juror Privacy at 13-15 (cited in note 5) (listing jurisdictions with court rules and rules of ethics
that prohibit postverdict contact with jurors absent a showing of good cause). The explanation
offered by one court of its rule barring postverdict investigation of jurors is typical:
It may appear odd to recognize a ground for the invalidation of a verdict while denying a
litigant a chance to find out whether such an event perchance did occur. The fate of a
defendant is thus made to depend upon sheer luck, that the wrongful event somehow
comes to light. The weight of the criticism is appreciated, but when contending values
clash in their demands, a balance must be struck, and the balance struck is not shown to
be a poor one because in some unknowable cases there may be an injustice. Overall the
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rather than loosen, these restrictions.1°6 It is hard to see why courts
should balance the same interests differently by granting greater
access to the names and addresses of jurors than courts grant to the
jurors themselves.
Once a defendant raises a credible reason why he believes a
juror's identity could lead to evidence sufficient to impeach the
verdict, the court should make a reasonable effort to accommodate
defense counsel's investigation, without unnecessarily jeopardizing
the integrity of jury deliberations or the privacy or well-being of
jurors. This accommodation might involve unconditional release of
the juror's name. A court, however, could instead choose to preserve
the juror's anonymity by supervising defense interviews of jurors,107 or
by limiting access to jurors' names to the defendant, the lawyers, and
their investigators, barring disclosure to the press and public.108 The
instances of invalidating misbehavior are exceedingly few.... Thus there is but a small
factor of possible hurt. Against this must be weighed the substantial interest of the
public and of defendants as a group, in the full and free debate in the jury room.
State v. LaFera, 42 N.J. 97, 199 A.2d 630, 636 (1964).
106. See generally Goldstein, 1993 U. Ill. L. Rev. at 307-12 (cited in note 35) (advocating
criminal penalties for jurors who disclose deliberations and for representatives of the media who
attempt to solicit them). Heightened concern about the effects of media access to jurors recently
prompted the Supreme Court of Connecticut to create a Task Force on Post-Verdict Juror
Interviews, which is expected to release its findings this year. Some would prefer to reverse this
trend. See Benjamin M. Lawsky, Limitations on Attorney Postverdict Contact with Jurors:
Protecting the Criminal Jury and Its Verdict at the Expense of the Defendant, 94 Colum. L. Rev.
1950 (1994) (advocating greater access to jurors by defense attorneys).
107. For example, a judge in a recent murder case refused to disclose the jurors' names and
addresses to the defendants and their attorneys, even after proof that an uncle of one of the
defendants had pressured one of the jurors to acquit. Instead, the judge subpoenaed all the
jurors and heard the attorneys question them in open court. This procedure was upheld on
appeal. See People v. Barton, 37 Cal. App. 4th 709 (1995). See also State ex rel. Butler v.
Howard, 1994 WL 4300 (Mo. App. Jan. 11, 1994) (noting that "the trial court has a duty, in
those cases where good cause has been shown, to provide for juror interviews in any manner
which does not amount to harassment and gives the highest degree of reliability to their
responses," and suggesting that "the court summon the individual jurors to court and supervise
the interrogation in the presence of both parties, in open court, with a court reporter recording
the proceedings"); United States v. Franklin, 546 F. Supp. 1133 (N.D. Ind. 1982) (detailing the
protections judges can impose on postverdict interviews ofjurors by defense counsel); Remmer v.
United States, 347 U.S. 227 (1954) (holding that the defendant was entitled to an open hearing
to determine whether the jury had been influenced by an improper source).
108. See, for example, Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 237(d) (West, 1995) (providing that upon a
finding that a compelling governmental interest warrants disclosing juror identities to a crimi-
nal defendant, "the court may require agreement that the defendant, defendant's counsel, or
defendant's investigator not divulge jurors' identities or identifying information to others').
Protections like these seem most probable when jurors' fears of losing anonymity are particu-
larly acute. In order to limit dissemination of juror identity effectively, a judge would have to be
very clear about what the lawyers could do with the information. For example, the judge
presiding over the Florida trial of the men who allegedly burned an African-American tourist
alive attempted to keep the jurors' identities from the press by releasing them to the attorneys
alone. The judge had to select a new jury in a new venue, however, after the prosecutors
circulated the list of prospective jurors to more than 300 staff members asking them to ask their
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defendant's interest in a fair trial requires no greater protection than
this.109
C. First Amendment Objections by the Media to Routine Anonymity
Like defendants, media representatives claim that their right
to learn jurors' identities is protected by the Constitution and cannot
be removed or impaired except under the rarest of circumstances. Of
the cases in which the Supreme Court has examined this right of
access to trial proceedings, two are most instructive: Press Enterprise
I,110 decided in 1984, and Press Enterprise 11,111 decided two years
later. The Court in Press Enterprise I established that the media has
the right to be present during the jury selection portion of a criminal
trial, a right that can only be denied if a judge first finds "that closure
is essential to preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve
that interest."112 In Press Enterprise II, the Court clarified when this
right can be claimed and limited. The Court explained that only if the
"place and process have historically been open to the press and gen-
eral public," and if "public access plays a significant positive role in
the functioning of the particular process" will a "qualified first
amendment right of access" to the proceedings exist.113 That right is
not absolute, but is violated by a closure order unless the trial court
spouses and roommates for information about the veniremembers. Trial Moved to Shield Jury
in Case of Burned Tourist, N.Y. Times B10 (June 17, 1993); Sue Carlton, Jurors' Privacy at
Issue in Case, St. Petersburg Times 1B (June 16, 1993).
109. Occasionally, defendants will seek access to a jury list for purposes of challenging the
demographic composition of the list. See, for example, Bennett and Hirschorn, Bennett's Guide
to Jury Selection, App. Vol. at 30-33 (cited in note 97) (including a sample motion and
memorandum of law for disclosure of jury lists for purposes of preparing a motion challenging
the compliance with jury selection procedures). Juror anonymity need not impair this
important right. A master jury list, qualified list, or even a list of veniremembers reveals names
and addresses, but it does not disclose which of the disclosed names goes with a particular
veniremember's number.
Still, with access to a list, a few litigants who have enough money and incentive may choose
to investigate the comings and goings of each veniremember systematically in order to
determine which among them have been chosen to serve as jurors. In cases where the judge
thinks this might be a problem, the judge could try to provide the demographic information that
the defendant needs to assess the legality of the venire without giving access to the identity of
the veniremembers. This might be accomplished by redacting particular segments on the list
(first names, if the challenge is based on ethnicity, names and street numbers if the challenge is
based on geography, or last names if the challenge is gender-based), or even providing revelant
statistics through confidential analysis.
110. Press Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 464 U.S. 501 (1984).
111. 478 U.S. 1 (1986).
112. 464 U.S. at 510. Under this test, the Court concluded that the decision of the judge to
close voir dire without considering alternatives exceeded constitutional limits. Id. at 513.
113. 478 U.S. at 8-13.
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makes written findings that (1) there is a "substantial probability"
that access would undermine a compelling interest, such as the de-
fendant's right under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to an impar-
tial jury, and (2) "reasonable alternatives to closure cannot adequately
protect" that interest.14
The anonymity policy this Essay advances does not infringe
any right described by these cases. Indeed, there would appear to be
no qualified constitutional right of access to juror names, as opposed
to jury proceedings.15 First, even accepting tradition as a valid
measure of the scope of the rights of the media in the jury context, as
the Court seems to do,116 it is not accurate to conclude that the public
has historically enjoyed an unconditional privilege to learn of juror
identity. Necessity, not reason, has been the catalyst for public access
to juror identity in criminal cases. At the time the First Amendment
was adopted, jurors were usually known to the parties and the
public-handpicked, white, male, religiously qualified landowners,
often farmers, from the community surrounding the crime.11 Even as
114. Applying this test, the Supreme Court rejected a trial judge's decision to close a pre-
liminary hearing to press and public. Id. at 13-15. For a recent application of the Court's test,
see United States v. Antar, 38 F.3d 1348, 1363 (3d Cir. 1994) (criticizing the judge who withheld
the transcript of voir dire from the press for failing to make on-the-record findings of "the actual
expectation of an unwarranted intrusion upon juror deliberations or of a probability of
harassment of jurors beyond what the jurors, rather than what a particular judge, may deem to
be acceptable").
115. Distinguished judges applying the two-prong test of tradition and function from Press
Enterprise 11 have reached opposite conclusions on this point, some concluding that neither
history nor logic supports a constitutionally based entitlement to juror identities. Compare
Baltimore Sun, 841 F.2d at 76 (finding a right of access to juror names), with Gannett, 571 A.2d
at 751 (concluding that tradition has given courts discretion over whether to release juror
names), cert. denied 495 U.S. 918 (1990); United States v. Edwards, 823 F.2d 111, 120 (5th Cir.
1987) (noting that the court had earlier held that a trial judge's refusal to release the names and
addresses of jurors violated no first amendment right of access and upholding a similar decision
by a judge to redact names from released transcripts), cert. denied 485 U.S. 934 (1988).
116. As new pressures on the jury system have emerged, many "traditional" jury proce-
dures have fallen by the wayside over the years, including the key-man selection system, the
twelve-person jury, the prohibition on juror note-taking or questioning, and the requirement of
unanimity. For a critique of the historical test and citations to courts that have abandoned it,
see Fred A. Bernstein, Note, Behind the Gray Door: Williams, Secrecy, and the Federal Grand
Jury, 69 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 563, 606-611 (1994).
117. See Albert W. Alschuler and Andrew G. Deiss, A Brief History of the Criminal Jury in
the United States, 61 U. Chi. L. Rev. 867, 878-882 (1994) (describing juror selection practices of
the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries); Abramson, We, the Jury at 29 nn.56-57
(cited in note 65) (describing Colonial juror selection practices). Professor Thornton Miller, a
historian who recently published a book about Virginia courts of the Colonial period, describes
litigation of the time as providing "a justice of familiarity, where the judges, the grand and petit
jury members, the attorneys, and the litigants all knew each other." F. Thornton Miller, Juries
and Judges Versus the Law-Virginia's Provincial Legal Perspective, 1783-1828 at 30 (U. Va.,
1994). Even though jury districts in federal cases were much larger, extending initially over an
entire state, the Judiciary Act specified that capital cases (a majority of federal crimes at the
152
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our agrarian society evolved into an urban one, jury service continued
to be reserved for property holders of good character known to the
bailiff, sheriff, or judge, who also happened to be among those whose
identities would be well known to the press and public. 118 It is only in
the past thirty years that random selection of jurors from a cross
section of the community has replaced these "key-man" systems,
bringing to every jury box the obscure as well as the prominent." 9 Of
course, in many places where juries are drawn from smaller towns or
neighborhoods, jurors may still be easily identified by acquaintances,
relatives, classmates, neighbors, or co-workers. But a vanishing so-
cial reality should not be mistaken for an immutable constitutional
right.
Second, courts have for many decades retained the "inherent
power to control the release of jurors' names,"120 belying claims that
media access to juror identity has enjoyed unwavering protection.
Numerous federal and state statutes and rules grant judges the op-
tion of sealing juror names from the parties, the public, or both.121 For
time) be tried by jurors summoned from the county of the offense. See Abramson, We, the Jury
at 35-36 (cited in note 65).
118. Professor Alschuler and Andrew Deiss quote as one example a Delaware statute from
1811, which "commanded the sheriff to summon 'sober, discreet and judicious freeholders,
lawful men and of fair characters, and inhabitants of his bailiwick, to serve as petitjurors .... "'
Alschuler and Deiss, 61 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 878 n.57 (cited in note 117). The same authors also
note, however, that in some jurisdictions, the jurors who ended up in the jury box were not
always the most "upstanding" of citizens. Sometimes bystanders filled in when extra jurors
were needed, and some of these did not meet the property-holding requirements of regular
jurors. Id. at 882.
119. Robert Lloyd Raskopf, A First Amendment Right of Access to a Juror's Identity:
Toward a Fuller Understanding of the Jury's Deliberative Process, 17 Pepperdine L. Rev. 357,
370 (1990) (noting that only recently in the history of the jury system have most jurors become
strangers to the litigants and to the observing public); Abramson, We, the Jury at 99 (cited in
note 65) (stating that 60% of federal courts in 1967 still chose jurors by soliciting names of "men
of recognized intelligence and probity" from community notables). In the late 1950s, when
asked to justify the absence of African-Americans from jury lists, one jury commissioner using
the '"ey-man" system claimed that "neither he nor any of the other 'key-men' in the community
with whom he consulted happened to know many qualified blacks personally." Id. at 110.
120. Gannett, 571 A.2d at 746-47, 746 n.14 (collecting statutes and rules of the federal
courts and eleven states that permit trial judges to keep juror names confidential and rejecting
the claim that the historical practice in the nation requires announcement ofjurors' names). In
many jurisdictions the practice of entering the jurors' names into the record remains. See Colo.
Ct. Rule 347(q) (requiring that the clerk enter the jurors' names into the record).
121. See, for example, 28 U.S.C. § 1863(b)(7) (1988 ed.) (noting that federal judges may
keep juror names confidential in any case where the interest of justice so requires); Okla.
Stat. § 853.1 (1995) (providing that the court upon good cause may withhold "the identity and
the business or residential address of any prospective or sworn juror to any person ... other
than to counsel for either party); Del. Code Ann. § 4513(a) (1974 & Supp. 1994) (providing that
courts have discretion to keep the names and questionnaires of jurors confidential); D.C. Code
§ 11-1904(a)(3) (1981) (providing that a plan for jury selection shall include provisions for
disclosure of juror names except in cases in which the chief judge determines that
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evidence that state judges and legislators are willing to limit media
access to protect juror anonymity, one need look no further than rules
barring television coverage of jurors in every one of the thirty-five
states that presently allow television cameras in criminal trials.122
Moreover, as the Court's two-prong test recognizes, even the
hoariest of traditions isn't worth preserving if it doesn't work. Press
access to the names of jurors during trial serves no salutary function
-when full access to every other aspect of the trial proceeding is guar-
anteed.123 The benefits of press access to jury selection and jury tri-
confidentiality is required); Ind. Code Ann. § 33-4-5.5-12(g) (Burns, 1973 & Supp. 1995)
(providing that "[tihe names of qualified jurors drawn from the qualified jury wheel and the
contents of jury qualification forms completed by those jurors shall not be made available to the
public until the period of service of those jurors shall have expired, except that attorneys in any
cases in which these jurors may serve, shall have access to the information"); Ind. S. Dist CR-
3 (5) (1994) (permitting judges to direct that "the names and addresses of the jurors or
prospective jurors not be publicly released except as required by statute, and that no photograph
be taken or sketch made of any juror within the environs of the Court"); Minn. Gen. Prac. Rule
814 (granting the judge discretion to withhold the names and addresses of jurors); N.H. Rev.
Stat. Ann. § 91-A5:I (Equity, 1994) (exempting jury records from the "right-to-know" law). The
history of some of these provisions is detailed in Noah B. Salamon, Comment: All the News that
Fits? Anonymous Juries, Particularized Justice and the Appearance of Fairness 43-47
(unpublished manuscript) (copy on file with the Author).
122. Ruth Ann Strickland and Richier H. Moore, Jr., Cameras in State Courts: A Historical
Perspective, 78 Judicature 128, 134-35 (Nov.-Dec. 1994).
Another theory with which the press has attempted to gain access to the names and ad-
dresses of jurors is to characterize juror lists and accompanying questionnaires as "public
records" that the Constitution requires remain open to public inspection. Compare by analogy
Antar, 38 F.3d at 1360 (finding that the trial judge's refusal to grant the press access to the
transcript of voir dire denied a common law right of access to transcripts and judicial records);
Raskopf, 17 Pepperdine L. Rev. at 365 n.59 (cited in note 119) (listing cases granting the right of
access to related documents such as warrants and sentencing documents); Eugene Cerruti,
"Dancing in the Courthouse:" The First Amendment Right of Access Opens a New Round, 29 U.
Richmond L. Rev. 237, 266-69 (1995) (same). This theory has the same weaknesses as the
argument under Press Enterprise II, however, since jury lists, as opposed to transcripts of the
voir dire proceedings, may not be one of those documents to which the press has historically had
access, even if counsel has. See Joshua Okun, Investigation of Jurors by Counsel: Its Impact on
the Decisional Process, 56 Georgetown L. J. 839, 850 nn.41-42 (1968) (collecting cases and court
rules denying the release of jury lists); Juror Privacy (cited in note 5) (same). At least one court
has noted that there is no constitutional or common law right of access to jury lists not entered
into evidence or filed in court. Newsday, Inc. v. Sise, 71 N.Y.2d 146, 518 N.E.2d 930 (1987).
123. See Gannett, 571 A.2d at 750-51 (finding that disclosure of the jurors' identities to the
press and the public "promotes neither the fairness nor the perception of fairness, when the
parties are provided with the jurors' names and all proceedings are open to the public");
Newsday, 518 N.E.2d at 933 n.4 ("Inasmuch as petitioner has not contended that it has been
denied access to any judicial proceedings or to any transcripts of any proceedings, petitioner's
constitutional right of access has not been violated'; Edwards, 823 F.2d at 120 (upholding the
trial judge's decision to edit juror names from the transcript, noting the jurors' interest in
privacy and freedom from harassment and concluding that the redacted transcripts revealed the
"substance and significance of the issues). As an analogy, one could not very well claim that
the failure to provide voter identities deprives the press of the ability to cover elections and
their results.
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als124 are preserved by unfettered access to proceedings in which the
jurors are numbered, not named. As the Supreme Court itself sug-
gested in Press Enterprise I, if there is a valid concern for juror pri-
vacy, it is better to allow media access to selection proceedings that
identify jurors by number than it is to bar the press from the jury
selection proceedings altogether.125 Juror anonymity permits the
press to continue to cover jury selection and the jury during the trial
in lurid detail (recall the description of Juror Number 92, above),
disclosing everything and anything that may titillate and inform
readers, listeners, and viewers-except for the faces, names, and
addresses of the jurors themselves.126
Sometimes press advocates will join the defense bar in the
argument that juror anonymity promotes deception during voir dire,
belittling the potential benefits of anonymity on the reliability of juror
responses.1 27  This argument is particularly disingenuous given the
media's passionate and steadfast defense of confidentiality for its own
sources on the basis that absolute anonymity is the only way to obtain
information that would otherwise expose these sources to retaliation
or embarrassment. (Indeed, when jurors do choose to speak about
124. See Press Enterprise I, 464 U.S. at 508-09 (noting that public trials promote confidence
that standards of fairness are being observed and provide an outlet for retributive feelings of the
public).
125. Id. at 512-13 (striking down an order barring the press from voir dire in a trial
involving the rape and murder of a teenage girl, noting that the judge failed to consider whether
he could have disclosed "the substance of the sensitive answers while preserving the anonymity
of the jurors involved" and that a valid privacy right may rise to such a level that the name of a
juror should be withheld to protect the person from embarrassment); id. at 520 (Marshall, J.,
concurring) C[Tlhe constitutionally preferable method for reconciling the first amendment
interests of the public and the press with the legitimate privacy interests of jurors and the
interests of defendants in fair trials is to redact transcripts in such a way as to preserve the
anonymity of jurors while disclosing the substance of their responses'). See also Edwards, 823
F.2d at 120 ('The usefulness of releasing jurors' names appears to us highly questionable. The
transcripts will reveal the substance and significance of the issues").
126. In popular trials, the press provides the public with daily reports of when jurors roll
their eyes or chuckle, what they wear to court, and how they fix their hair. See Andrea Ford,
Simpson Panelists Offer Jury Watchers Few Clues, L.A. Times Al, A22 (Feb. 12, 1995) (detailing
every move of O.J. Simpson's unnamed jurors, describing their clothes, and listing, in an
"infobox," a few tidbits about each juror, such as, 'Black woman, 25. Flight attendant, very
demure, gives impression of shyness.... White woman, 24. Fire department receptionist. A
favorite in the press corps for her eccentric hairdo and guileless comments during voir dire").
127. One writer, for instance, blamed anonymity for the failure to discover a relationship
between a juror and a defendant, after the juror deliberately lied in order to get on the jury and
took bribes from the defendant, a mob boss. Marcia Chambers, Sua Sponte, Natl. L. J. 17 (Nov.
30, 1992). This can hardly be a common scenario, given the penalties for perjury and the
random nature ofjury selection in large communities where anonymity is feasible. See Litt, 25
Colum. J. L. & Soc. Probs. at 415 (cited in note 35) ('CThrough the publication of jurors' names,
the media has, in the past, induced third parties to produce information establishing that a
juror had not been completely candid during the voir dire").
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their jury experiences to the press, they often do so on the condition
that they remain anonymous.128) On occasion, the publication of a
juror's name along with the information provided by that juror has
prompted a vigilant news reader to question a juror's honesty. 12 9 Still,
the amount of misinformation revealed by the publication of juror
names may be dwarfed by the amount of deception that publicity
inspires. Because the practice of juror naming does not play a
significant positive role in the trial process today, we need not
enshrine it in the First Amendment. i3°
There remains the question of whether the press can claim a
right of access after the verdict to the names of jurors whose anonym-
ity was protected during trial in order to interview jurors about their
experiences and uncover injustice.131 Unlimited postverdict access to
jurors' names, however, is not necessary to secure a defendant's right
to a fair trial under the Constitution.132 It is hard to see why the press
should enjoy greater privileges. If anyone deserves juror names, it is
the attorney for the party most immediately affected by the jury's
conduct, who is also bound to follow professional rules of ethical be-
havior and remains subject to the control of the court.133
128. For a few recent examples, see Tracy Breton, Judge Refuses to Grant Ex-Brown Coach
a New Trial, Providence Journal-Bulletin 5B (April 28, 1995) (relying on information from a
juror who agreed to talk to reporters on the condition of anonymity); Marc Davis, Bystander
Shot by Police Officer Asks for $250,000, Virginian Pilot B3 (April 6, 1995) (quoting a juror who
requested anonymity); Peter Rowe, Choose to Disagree, but Do it Right, San Diego Union-Trib.
El (March 28, 1995) (quoting the jury forewoman in a case against Operation Rescue who asked
to remain anonymous); Peg Tyre and Scott Ladd, Trial Decided by Paper Trail, Newsday 5
(March 5, 1994) (quoting an anonymous juror in the World Trade Center bombing case and
reporting that when given the opportunity to talk to the press after the verdict, all of the jurors
declined).
129. See Litt, 25 Colum. J. L. & Soc. Probs. at 415 n.274 (cited in note 35).
130. Even if a court concluded that juror anonymity does implicate the media's qualified
right of access to public trials, the stringent requirements that must be met in order to justify
closing proceedings to the media do not apply to such a minor intrusion. The substitution of
numbers for names does not require the exacting standards of either Press Enterprise I or II. A
judicial or legislative determination that juror apprehension is widespread, or a juror's individ-
ually expressed preference for anonymity, should be sufficient proof that removing juror identity
from public scrutiny will promote more reliable jury proceedings and encourage citizen partici-
pation on juries.
131. As Robert Raskopf has argued, jury impropriety is occasionally uncovered through
media interviews with jurors. These revelations may not result in invalidation of the verdict
but "may result in reforms designed to minimize the possibility of such irregularities in the
future," such as misunderstanding of instructions. Raskopf, 17 Pepperdine L. Rev. at 372 &
n.107 (cited in note 119). Of the 5% of respondents to a survey on jury service who opposed
anonymity, one-fifth opposed it because they thought it would impede the ability of scholars and
journalists to keep tabs on the system. Glamour at 159 (cited in note 16).
132. See text accompanying notes 105-09.
133. At the very least, media access should be no greater than defense access, conditioned
upon the same type of good-cause showing that a defendant must advance in order to obtain
juror names. See, for example, Gannett, 571 A.2d at 750 ("We see no reason to afford the media
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Some courts have attempted to balance the benefits of juror
anonymity with the interest of the press in publishing jurors' stories
by delaying the release of juror names following the trial for a period
of time that ranges from one week to six months.'- 4 Gestures toward
anonymity that delay rather than prevent exposure are a good start,135
but they do not go far enough. It is not much of a comfort to a juror to
learn that the court has guaranteed that all harassment, intimida-
greater rights of access to jurors' names than the Constitution permits the parties to a trial");
Tex. Crim. Pro. Code Ann. art. 35.29 (providing for some preliminary showing of a good cause
for both the media and a party); U.S. D. Md. Rule 16 (providing that in order to interview a
former juror, anyone must first obtain an order of the court); U.S. D. La. Rule 13.05E ("Under
no circumstances except by leave of Court granted upon good cause shown shall any.., person
examine or interview any juror"); West. Ark. Rule E-1 ("No juror shall be contacted without
express permission of the Court and under such conditions as the Court may prescribe"). But
see In re Express-News Corp., 695 F.2d 807, 810 (5th Cir. 1982) (holding that under a local court
rule requiring good cause to be shown to obtain access to jurors, the right to gather news is good
cause sufficient to allow interviews).
As Professor Albert Alschuler has recognized, the prevailing practice today is backwards:
the press enjoys more freedom to interrogate jurors about their deliberations than defense
counsel. See Albert W. Alschuler, The Supreme Court and the Jury: Voir Dire, Peremptory
Challenges, and the Review of Jury Verdicts, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 153, 226 (1989) ("Our legal
system fosters confidentiality by forbidding disclosure only when disclosure would save a
defendant from wrongful punishment. We permit disclosure for the sake of informing and
entertaining the public and amusing friends at cocktail parties"). Professor Alschuler, however,
considers this discrepancy a reason for greater defense access to jurors, equivalent to that
enjoyed by the press. Id. See also Lawsky, 94 Colum. L. Rev. at 1962 (cited in note 106). I agree
that the limits on parties and press need to be aligned, but I would use the limited access that
parties receive as the appropriate standard. See also Goldstein, 1993 U. Ill. L. Rev. at 307 (cited
in note 35) (arguing that "there is every reason to suppose that interrogation of jurors by the
media is even more likely than questioning by lawyers and judges to interfere with the policies
supporting privacy and secrecy .... [J]ournalists are not constrained in what they ask, as are
lawyers, by professional discipline or by rules of ethics').
For examples of judicial reluctance to limit press access, as distinguished from defense
access, to jurors, see Journal Publishing Co. v. Mechem, 801 F.2d 1233, 1236 (10th Cir. 1986)
(reasoning that because the media has less incentive to upset a verdict than does a losing party
or an attorney for a convicted defendant, a court may broadly proscribe attorney and party
contact with former jurors, but does not have the same freedom to restrict press interviews with
former jurors); Antar, 38 F.3d at 1348 (striking down a trial judge's order barring the media
from interviewing former jurors when not supported by findings of impending threat of jury
harassment by the press); Globe Newspaper, 920 F.2d at 91 ("[S]tronger reasons to withhold
juror names and addresses will often exist during a trial than after a verdict is rendered. After
the verdict, release normally would seem less likely to harm the rights of the particular
accuseds to a fair trial").
134. United States v. Doherty, 675 F. Supp. 719 (D. Mass. 1987) (finding that the press has
a constitutional right of access to juror names after a verdict, but allowing a seven-day grace
period before releasing names to allow intense public interest to dissipate and jurors to "rejoin
their families and take up their private pursuits"). The names of the former jurors in the
Lozano trial were released six months after the verdict. See Abramovsky, N.Y. L. J. at 3 (cited
in note 59).
135. As jury researcher Thomas F. Hafemeister states, "Generally the attention given to a
trial dies down dramatically a few days after the verdict as the media moves on to other stories
and the trial becomes old news." Hafemeister, Letter at 2 (cited in note 3).
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tion, or retaliation will be postponed for a little while after she and
her fellow jurors announce their verdict.
Unless there is a showing that juror names will assist in
establishing that misconduct undermined the fairness of the verdict,
we need not offer the press, the public, or defendants any more
opportunity to intrude into the safety, privacy, and deliberations of
jurors than jurors themselves offer voluntarily. Considering the
market for juror tell-all stories, we can hardly expect every juror to
remain anonymous forever. 136 In many cases, jurors will relinquish
their anonymity willingly, providing insights into jury deliberations. 137
In other cases, journalists and jury researchers may be able to
arrange with judges to interview former jurors and report findings
without revealing juror identities.
Juror anonymity is also less burdensome to the rights of the
press than either restrictions on the publication of known information
about jurorsas or limits on the content and nature of press
136. See Strauss, 12 Yale L. & Policy Rev. at 394 (cited in note 55) (surveying incidents of
'Juror journalism" and concluding that the relatively small number of reported juror journalists
is "only the tip of the iceberg" and that "the number of jurors contemplating fame and
fortune... will almost certainly increase substantially in the future," noting increased
television coverage, public appetite for crime stories, and the proliferation of talk shows
encouraging jurors to reveal details).
137. Dolan, LA. Times at Al (cited in note 23); Lawsky, 94 Colum. L. Rev. at 1968 n.138,
(cited in note 106) (noting television appearances of jurors); Paul Thaler, The Watchful Eye:
American Justice in the Age of the Television Trial 178 (Praeger, 1994) (recounting media
solicitations of ex-jurors); Abramson, We, the Jury at 204 n.* (cited in note 65) (recounting juror
descriptions of deliberations in the trial of the Branch Davidians, a trial in which the jurors
were anonymous); Strauss, 12 Yale L. & Policy Rev. at 421 (cited in note 55) (noting the
temptation of fame, even if profit from juror journalism is banned).
138. Prior restraints are invariably struck down, in" part because less burdensome alterna-
tives, such as limiting access to jurors' names and addresses, are available. See, for example,
State ex rel. New Mexico Press Assn. v. Kaufman, 98 N.M. 261, 648 P.2d 300 (1982) (rejecting a
court order that prevented the publication of jurors' names because the judge had failed first to
explore other reasonable alternatives for guarding against the improper influence of jurors);
State ex rel. Natl. Broadcasting Co. v. Court of Common Pleas, 556 N.E.2d 1120 (Ohio 1990)
(striking down an order preventing publication of jurors' names and pictures as a prior restraint
and distinguishing as less restrictive an order that withholds the announcement of jurors'
names); Times Publishing Co. v. State, 632 So.2d 1072 (Fla. App. 1994) (striking down an order
granting the defendant's motion to bar the publication of any juror information, finding that
discomfort of potential jurors in the original venue about "being in the glare of media coverage"
was not sufficient to warrant a prior restraint and noting that the press did not challenge an
order barring the release of juror names and addresses). See generally Diane M. Allen,
Propriety of Order Forbidding News Media From Publishing Names and Addresses of Jurors in
Criminal Cases, 36 A.L.R.4th 1126 (1994).
Allowing reporters to publish names and contact jurors, but only if they can identify them
on their own, obviously sends a mixed message about the freedom of the press to report on jury
identities. Like many attempts to balance competing interests, however, it is a compromise.
See Globe Newspaper, 920 F.2d at 88.
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investigations of jurors. 139 Anonymous juries are, in sum, an ideal
compromise between the interests of jurors, defendants, and the
public in a jury free from apprehension about exposure, on the one
hand, and the interests of insuring adequate disclosure of the
workings of the jury system on the other.
VI. CONCLUSION
The escalating demands of the media upon jurors, intensified
in recent years by television coverage of criminal trials, appear to be
creating widespread apprehension about jury service. The Supreme
Court has recently taken unprecedented steps to protect jurors from
the degrading experience of being excluded from jury service because
of their race or gender, even when those steps conflict with the
interests of criminal defendants. 140 A growing crisis of juror dread
may call for strategies that are no less far-reaching.
139. See Antar, F.3d at 1348; United States v. Sherman, 581 F.2d 1358 (9th Cir. 1978)
(finding that an order prohibiting all contact with jurors by "everyone," including the media,
violated the First Amendment absent a finding that such contact would pose a serious and
imminent threat to a protected interest); Express-News, 695 F.2d at 807 (striking down judicial
orders that barred the media from asking jurors about deliberations); Journal Publishing, 801
F.2d at 1233 (striking down an order prohibiting all press contact with jurors). But see United
States v. Harrelson, 713 F.2d 1114 (5th Cir. 1983) (upholding a district court order barring the
press from asking jurors about other jurors' votes or asking more than once for an interview).
140. Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42 (1992) (prohibiting criminal defendants from
exercising peremptory challenges on the basis of race); J.E.B. v. Alabama Ex Rel. T.B., 114
S. Ct. 1419, 128 L. Ed. 2d 242 (1994) (prohibiting criminal defendants from exercising
peremptory challenges on the basis of gender).
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